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The Institutional Progress Clause
Jake Linford*
ABSTRACT
There is a curious anomaly at the intersection of copyright and
free speech.
In cases like Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, the United States Supreme Court has exhibited a profound
distaste for tailoring free speech rights and restrictions based on the
identity of the speaker. The Copyright Act, however, is full of such
tailoring, extending special rights to some copyright owners and special
defenses to some users. A Supreme Court serious about maintaining
speaker neutrality would be appalled.
A set of compromises at the heart of the Copyright Act reflects
interest-group lobbying rather than a careful consideration of what
kinds of institutions best realize the goal of the Progress Clause—the
provision that expressly empowers Congress to provide copyright
protection. Assuming the democratic process is flawed for predictable
public-choice reasons, how might the Court address these problems in
the Copyright Act?
The answer is institutional analysis. First Amendment scholars
have for some years used institutions as analytical and normative tools.
This framework considers how different social institutions may serve
First Amendment goals—like creating a robust marketplace of ideas—
through their structure and function. This Article is the first to explore
how the Progress Clause can serve a similar role and provides a
*
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framework to consider whether certain institutions are particularly wellsuited to enable the creation, dissemination, or preservation of valuable
expression. Inasmuch as Congress has granted special privileges to
institutions
that
serve
Progress
Clause
values,
the
speaker-based tailoring is constitutionally acceptable—even if the
process by which it occurs is suspect. Applying this institutional
framework can help clarify not only the extent to which the current
Copyright Act achieves the constitutional goals it was crafted to reach,
but also when Congress should adopt or reject amendments and
extensions to the Copyright Act.
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution—sometimes
referred to as the “Progress Clause”—authorizes Congress to grant “to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries,”1 i.e., copyright and patent protection. This power is
internally limited by the Progress Clause, which authorizes the grant
of an exclusive right only “for limited times” and for the stated purpose
of “promot[ing] the progress of Science and useful Arts.”2 The First
Amendment also limits the authority to grant copyright protection
because, as the Court has recognized, “some restriction on expression is

1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2.
Id.; see, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion
of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1810–16
(2006).
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the inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright.”3 While
commentators have argued that copyright laws should be subject to
“procedural and substantive” First Amendment constraints,4 the
Supreme Court has not applied searching First Amendment scrutiny to
any provision of the Copyright Act to date.5
There is something nevertheless puzzling about the relationship
between copyright protection and free expression. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly invalidated statutes that discriminate among classes of
speakers.6 For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute barring
independent expenditures in elections based on the speaker’s corporate
identity.7 But the Copyright Act is filled with provisions that run
counter to this principle of speaker neutrality, instead providing a
broader range of copyright protections to certain classes of speakers,8
which this Article, following the relevant literature, refers to as
“institutions.”9 Scholars and courts have acknowledged the speech3.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–90 (2012) (noting that Congressional activity will
not trigger First Amendment scrutiny so long as Congress does not alter the traditional contours
of copyright law that provide “built-in First Amendment accommodations” (citing Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003))).
4.
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, First Amendment Skein]; see also Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 59 (2002)
(“Copyright is today in the same position, vis-à-vis the First Amendment, as libel was before New
York Times v. Sullivan. Just as the Court in Sullivan finally began issuing a set of special
constitutional rules confining the reach of libel law, so the courts must eventually do for
copyright.”).
5.
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (2012) (rejecting a call to engage in
“heightened [First Amendment] review” because the provision under review did not disturb
traditional speech-protective contours built into the Copyright Act like the idea-expression
distinction or the fair use defense); see also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1783
[hereinafter Schauer, Boundaries] (2004) (“Copyright law, especially recently, has been the subject
of some criticism, but its pervasive regime of content regulation and prior restraint remains largely
unimpeded by the First Amendment.”). Indeed, until fairly recently, constitutional law scholars
tended to overlook the Progress Clause. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 953, 955 n.7 (2007).
6.
See infra Part I.A.
7.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
8.
For example, Congress recently restored copyright protection to the works of foreign
nationals whose works fell into the public domain without restoring the copyright of works by US
authors. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012); see also infra Part III.B. Other provisions grant unique defenses
to certain institutions against the copyright owners’ exclusive right. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012)
(granting specific exceptions to copyright liability to libraries and other archives); see also infra
Parts III.A, III.C.
9.
In the article that launched the field of new institutional economics, Douglass C.
North defined institutions broadly, as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction,” including formal and informal constraints. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance
Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 360 (1994). Some intellectual property scholars have taken
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restrictive potential of copyright protection,10 which raises the
possibility that much of the current Copyright Act may be
unconstitutional because it favors groups in a way inconsistent with the
Court’s commitment to speaker neutrality in the free speech arena.11
Many scholars have pushed back on the Court’s resistance to
institutional tailoring in interpreting the Speech Clause.12 As argued
by scholars like Frederick Schauer, institutions like libraries,
universities, and the professional press might deserve “special
solicitude” under the Speech Clause because in their typical operation,
they advance First Amendment goals.13 The Court has rejected
institutional tailoring in the speech domain,14 but it has been more
sympathetic to institutional tailoring when justified on other
constitutional grounds. For example, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
a similarly broad approach in defining First Amendment institutions—like best practices in
content-creating and content-using industries—that might deserve deferential treatment from
Congress and the courts. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Some Optimism About Fair Use and
Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 351, 358 (2010). This Article instead follows Paul
Horwitz and uses a narrower construction that defines institutions as organizations, focusing more
on the entities that can embody “institutional norms,” rather than the norms themselves. See PAUL
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 11 (2013).
10.
See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text; see infra notes 101–114 and
accompanying text.
11.
See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The text of the
First Amendment] offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single individuals
to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated
associations of individuals . . . .”); Peter DiCola, Copyright Equality, Free Speech, Efficiency, and
Regulatory Parity in Distribution, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1837, 1891–92 (2013) (arguing that courts should
review copyright’s unequal regulatory provisions to the same First Amendment scrutiny that other
media regulations receive).
12.
See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 471 (2005)
[hereinafter Horwitz, Grutter’s] (suggesting that Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), can be
read as the rare case in which the Supreme Court takes institutions seriously); Frederick Schauer,
Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1765 (2007)
[hereinafter Schauer, Categories] (“[M]ost of the arguments against using institution-specific
categories in law in general and in constitutional law in particular do not carry the day.”);
Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 97
(1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles] (arguing that apparent departures from standard First
Amendment analysis in the cases of Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666 (1998), which held that a public broadcaster can reasonably exclude an independent
candidate from a presidential debate, and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569
(1998), which held that a regulation that required the NEA to take general standards of “decency
and respect” for religious beliefs into account in denying grant applications was not facially invalid
or unconstitutionally vague, can be explained and justified “in terms of institutionally specific
rules and principles”).
13.
See infra Part II.A.
14.
See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 6) (noting that “the Court has [ignored the textual directive of the Press Clause
and] extended to the press no protection beyond the rights guaranteed to all by the Speech
Clause”).
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Court held that the Free Expression Clause of the First Amendment
extends “special solicitude” to the rights of religious institutions.15
This Article adds to that literature by arguing that institutions
may also have the potential to inherently serve “Progress” values. For
example, some institutions, like universities, include among their
traditional functions the progress value of increasing and cataloging the
storehouse of human knowledge. Others institutions may serve key
roles in disseminating new works to the public and providing a reward
for creators. Some disparate treatment might thus be justified under
the Progress Clause even if it is not justified under the First
Amendment.
Part I sets the stage by describing the limits that the Progress
Clause and the First Amendment place on Congressional authority to
enact copyright protection and discussing how the disparate treatment
built into the Copyright Act may run afoul of the Court’s First
Amendment bar against speaker-based regulation. Part II builds on
existing literature in the First Amendment sphere to argue that the
Copyright Act may be partially redeemed by identifying institutions
that externalize three key “Progress Clause values”: incentivizing
creation and dissemination, expanding knowledge, and providing public
access. Part III applies the proposed institutional review framework to
several provisions of the Copyright Act, highlighting examples of moreand less-appropriate tailoring. Part IV identifies how the institutional
review framework shows potential to improve judicial review,
encourage public activism, and shape interest-group behavior and
congressional activity.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND DISPARATE TREATMENT
This Part discusses the Court’s recognition of the value of
speaker neutrality in First Amendment law, particularly in the recent
decisions in Citizens United v. FEC and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. It
then sketches some of the problematic disparate treatment in the
Copyright Act, and addresses some less-feasible solutions to the
problem before introducing the potential of institutional tailoring
driven by Progress Clause values.

15.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012); Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014).
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A. The Trouble with Speaker-Based Distinctions
The First Amendment proclaims that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”16 That
pronouncement is not as absolute as a simple textual analysis would
indicate.17 While restrictions on some “well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech . . . have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem,”18 the Court applies some level of
constitutional scrutiny to the regulation of protectable speech.19 In
particular, the Court discourages inequitable, speaker-based
abridgments of free speech. It has repeatedly held that restrictions that
discriminate against or favor certain groups of speakers and not others
are unconstitutional.20 This is due in part to the potential of speaker16.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17.
See, e.g., Members of the City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (“The incidental restriction on expression which results from the City’s
attempt to [reduce visual clutter] is considered justified as a reasonable regulation of the time,
place, or manner of expression if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” (citing Heffron v.
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 61, 68–71 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 470–71 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115–17 (1972); Police Dep’t of Chi.
V. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972))). Note that an absolutist view of the First Amendment is likely
unworkable, and would render unconstitutional “all of contract law, most of antitrust law, and
much of criminal law.” Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981). The same would likely be true if an absolutist view were
applied to copyright law. But see, e.g., DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (2009) (arguing that
a correct interpretation of the First Amendment would make unconstitutional the grant of an
exclusive right in the reproduction of expression).
18.
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
478 (2010) (“From 1791 to the present . . . the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon
the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a freedom to disregard these
traditional limitations.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992))); see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (incitement);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (fighting
words).
19.
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (2011) (noting that a
state law restricting the sale of violent video games to minors “is invalid unless [the state] can
demonstrate that [the law] passes strict scrutiny” (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395)); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral
regulation of cable providers).
20.
Often, when the Court addresses constitutionally problematic disparities in the law,
it applies the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of the City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96 (1972) (“[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself,
government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny
use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”). This Article instead
considers the Court’s rationale for a speaker-neutral First Amendment. See also Jeffrey M. Blum,
The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and
Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1329 (1983) (“[C]ourts [are required] with
certain subject matter exceptions, to be strictly neutral with regard to a speaker's identity and
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based restrictions on speech to slide into content-based or viewpointbased discrimination,21 which are also disfavored forms of speech
restrictions.22
The Court first articulated a principle of speaker neutrality in
Police Department v. Mosley.23
In Mosley, the Court held
unconstitutional the city of Chicago’s regulation that banned picketing
in front of schools during school hours, except for “peaceful picketing of
any school involved in a labor dispute.”24 In finding the picketing ban
unconstitutional, the Court closely connected the barred
speaker-based distinction with invidious content-based distinctions
designed to keep certain topics out of the public forum.25
Mosley was a watershed case because it was the first time the
Court had described First Amendment protections in terms of
equality.26 Cases following Mosley clarified how discrimination against
groups of speakers could be problematic, even without an invidious
underlying content- or viewpoint-based goal.27 The Court invalidated

message in determining whether behavior satisfies the disruptive potential test.”); Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26–29 (1975);
Schauer, Principles, supra note 12, at 98–99 (noting that in the typical government enterprise
cases, the concern is not access, but discriminatory treatment, and concluding that “content-based
discriminatory treatment is appropriate in some [First Amendment] contexts but not in others”);
Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with
Anti-Pornography Law, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulations, 42 B.C.
L. REV. 1, 63 (2000) (“Various aspects of First Amendment law are structured to minimize
disparate effects on identifiable groups”).
21.
See Turner, 512 U.S. at 678 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189, 249 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation].
22.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396 (holding unconstitutional a prohibition on
“bias-motivated” fighting words because it was viewpoint based, even though a viewpoint neutral
prohibition on those words would be valid because the fighting words themselves are not protected
speech).
23.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100; see also Karst, supra note 20, at 26–27, discussed in Geoffrey
R. Stone, Kenneth Karst’s Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 37, 37–39 (2008) (noting that, after Mosley, if the government “allow[s] more speech than it
is constitutionally required to allow, the government creates an inequality that cases like Schacht
[v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)] and Mosley hold must be independently justified”).
24.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92–93.
25.
See id. at 100.
26.
See Karst, supra note 20, at 28. In the words of Justice Marshall’s majority opinion,
which blended equal protection and First Amendment analysis, “the crucial question is whether
there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.”
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972)). Justice Marshall
went on to note that “the First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Id. (citations
omitted).
27.
See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 194 (1999)
(“[Government] decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical messages are
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bans on political speech by banks and corporations,28 struck down
regulations that distinguished among media companies,29 and rejected
rules that prevent government employees from receiving an
honorarium for speaking, teaching, or writing articles on topics not
related to their employment.30
While there were indications that the Court was backing away
from a speaker-neutral First Amendment in cases like Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,31 the Court recently took a sharp
turn back toward the principle of a speaker-neutral First Amendment.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court
invalidated a ban on election advertising by corporations.32 The Court
concluded that Congress could not constitutionally treat corporations
differently than other speakers.33 Doing so would “tak[e] the right to
speak from some and giv[e] it to others . . . depriv[ing] the
in serious tension with the principles undergirding the First Amendment.” (citing Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784–85 (1978))).
28.
First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 435 U.S. at 793; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010); infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
29.
Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) (noting that a tax
could not constitutionally target “a small group within the press,” even though it did not target
particular viewpoints); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585, 592 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a tax that targeted the largest not only publishers
for taxation). But see Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). In Leathers, the Court held that a
sales tax on cable television (and later) satellite services that exempted newspapers and magazines
did not violate the First Amendment. In distinguishing Arkansas Writers’ and Minneapolis Star,
the Court concluded the tax in Leathers was acceptable precisely because it targeted an entire
media branch—cable operators (and later, satellite operators)—and not a smaller subset of a
particular media branch. Id. at 447–48. The Court in Leathers tried unsuccessfully to recast both
earlier cases as rejecting “a tax scheme that targets a small number of speakers” as dangerous
because such a tax “runs the risk of affecting only a limited range of views,” id. at 448, 453, but
there was, however, nothing content- or viewpoint-based about the taxes rejected in Minneapolis
Star or Arkansas Writers’.
30.
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468–70 (1995)
(concluding the regulation, while neither content- nor viewpoint-based, nevertheless “impose[d] a
significant burden on expressive activity” by the employees, and “on the public’s right to read and
hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said”).
31.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Scholars initially hailed
Turner as a vanguard of a new era, moving away from the principle of speaker neutrality. See, e.g.,
Erik Forde Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and the First Amendment After Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 60 MO. L. REV. 799, 831 (1995) (“After Turner, it is no longer
certain that regulations targeting particular media or organizations will be found
unconstitutional.”).
32.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010) (overruling Austin
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989)).
33.
Id. at 349 (“If the antidistortion rationale [propounded in an earlier case] were to be
accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker
is an association that has taken on the corporate form.”); see also James Ianelli, Noncitizens and
Citizens United, 56 LOY. L. REV. 869, 885–86 (2010) (“[T]he Court [in Citizens United] showed that
a principal concern with speaker-based restrictions is that they deprive citizens of their right to
hear from certain subsets of speakers . . . .”).
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disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to
establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”34 In his
concurrence in Citizens United, Justice Scalia reiterated that the First
Amendment “is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers. Its text offers
no foothold for excluding any category of speaker . . . .”35
Speaker-based preferences in the marketplace of ideas present
a variety of problems. They can distort public debate.36 They may be
motivated by the impermissible but not readily apparent goal of
enacting content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on speech.37 Speakerbased preferences might also produce disparate effects whose
restrictive impact can be difficult to measure in some cases.38 The
imposition of speaker-based regulation might indicate either that a
stated government interest motivating the speech restriction is
somewhat exaggerated,39 or that Congress has failed to take into
account the broader effects a certain benefit will have on nonbenefitted
speakers.40 The state may even silence speakers when it denies benefits
to those who speak out in certain ways but grants those same benefits
to those who remain silent or advocate in a different way.41
34.
Citizens United, 558 U. S. at 341 (“The Government may not by these means deprive
the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy
of consideration.”); see also id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the
proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity,
including its ‘identity’ as a corporation.”).
35.
Id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring); but see id. at 420–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“[I]n a variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated
differentially on account of the speaker’s identity, when identity is understood in categorical or
institutional terms. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights of
students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own employees. When such
restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental interest, they do not necessarily raise
constitutional problems.” (citations omitted)).
36.
Turner, 512 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Laws that treat all speakers
equally are relatively poor tools for controlling public debate, and their very generality creates a
substantial political check that prevents them from being unduly burdensome. Laws that single
out particular speakers are substantially more dangerous, even when they do not draw explicit
content distinctions.” (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 584, 591–92 (1983); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
37.
See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 454 (1996) (“So long as a content-neutral law
has differential effects on particular ideas—even assuming those effects are widely dispersed—it
may bear the taint of improper motive.”).
38.
See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 21, at 218.
39.
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2423 (1996) (defining copyright law as a “content-based
restriction[] on high-value speech imposed by the government acting as sovereign”).
40.
See Netanel, First Amendment Skein, supra note 4, at 59, 62.
41.
But see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 96 (1988) (refuting that argument as presented by striking union
workers in Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988)).
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Speaker-based tailoring can easily slide into viewpoint-based
tailoring, especially when the identified group benefitting from or
restricted by the tailoring holds certain views in common. For example,
if Congress passes a law that abridges the ability of identified members
of the Tea Party to gather in public places, it might indicate that those
in political opposition to the Tea Party, or those who disagree with ideas
typically associated with the Tea Party, were attempting to silence
dissenting views. On the other hand, a law that provides extra
privileges to members of the Tea Party might raise the specter of
legislative capture that can also distort speech by granting disparate
access.42
While it might be tempting to limit strict scrutiny of
speaker-based tailoring to political activity in light of the focus in
Citizens United on election advertising, the Court also recently applied
it to speaker-based restrictions on commercial speech. In Sorrell v. IMS
Health, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to strike down a
regulation barring the sale of information about doctors’ habits in
prescribing medicines to pharmaceutical detailers.43 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, noted that the law contained a content-based
restriction that disfavored marketing.44 But Justice Kennedy also
expressed concern about the law’s speaker-based effects, independent
of content.45 For example, under one provision of the statute at issue in
Sorrell, pharmacies could sell prescribing information to private or
academic researchers, but not to pharmaceutical marketers.46
The decisions in Citizens United and Sorrell signal a continuing
commitment by the Court to a speaker-neutral First Amendment in

42.
But see Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87,
101–02 (1982) (holding campaign disclosure requirements could not be applied to the Socialist
Workers Party because such disclosure would expose Party members to harassment, threats and
reprisals); Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a
Command of the First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583, 583 (querying whether the “First
Amendment compel[s] the government to exempt particular speakers from an otherwise
constitutional law of general application”).
43.
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011).
44.
Id. at 2663–64.
45.
See id. at 2667 (comparing Vermont’s bar on selling information to detailers to a
hypothetical statute, based on Minneapolis Star, that would prohibit “trade magazines from
purchasing or using ink”); see also Marcias M. Boumil, Pharmaceutical Gift Laws and Commercial
Speech Under the First Amendment in the Wake of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 8 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 133, 161 (2012) (“The regulation was . . . speaker-based because it allowed purchase
and use by some recipients (such as researchers and public health professionals) but not others
(specifically pharmaceutical companies and their marketing departments).”).
46.
See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662–63 (noting that the regulation was content-based, and
“[m]ore than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical
manufacturers”).
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both the political and commercial arenas.47 As identified in the next
subpart, the Copyright Act as currently constituted manifests
substantial institutional tailoring.48 Under the Court’s speaker-neutral
interpretation of the Speech Clause, much of this tailoring appears
unconstitutional.
B. Constitutional Implications of Copyright Tailoring
The Copyright Act boasts provisions that provide specific
advantages—and disadvantages—to different institutions or interest
groups. For example, Congress restored copyright protection to works
that had fallen out of protection in the United States because of a failure
to observe certain formalities.49 This restoration is available for works
created or initially owned by foreign residents or domiciliaries, but not
residents of the United States.50 In addition, the owner of the copyright
in a musical composition holds an exclusive right to publicly perform
the work—and therefore license that right to others—while the owner
of copyright in a sound recording has only the more limited right to
perform publicly the work through digital audio transmission.51 Thus,
terrestrial radio stations (i.e., over-the-air or broadcast stations) must
pay for the right to broadcast musical compositions, but not the sound
recordings embodying those compositions.52 Cable and satellite radio
stations and Internet radio stations both must pay a compulsory license
rate for the right to broadcast the sound recording as well. While cable
and satellite radio stations pay a relatively low license rate, Internet
radio stations pay a much higher rate.53
Defenses or exceptions to the reach of an author’s exclusive right
are also often institution-specific. Libraries and archives benefit from
specific exceptions to the copyright owner’s exclusive right to reproduce
the work.54 Likewise, veterans’ organizations and nonprofit fraternal
47.
The Court in Sorrell tried to cast its rejection of this regulation as consistent with
what it continues to construe as a ban on laws that target a “narrow class” of speakers, like
Arkansas Writers’ and Minneapolis Star. See id. at 2668 (noting that a ban on the speech of
pharmaceutical companies throughout the state is more reminiscent of the tax held constitutional
in Leathers that targets whole industries like cable operators without taxing other media
industries, like newspaper and magazine publishers); see also supra note 29 (describing how the
Court unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish Leathers from the earlier precedents); DiCola, supra
note 11 at 1886. Thus, like Citizens United, Sorrell signals a strong shift away from the speakerbased tailoring tolerated in Leathers.
48.
See infra Part I.B.
49.
See infra Part III.B.
50.
17 U.S.C. § 104(A)(g) (2012).
51.
Compare id. § 106(4), with id. § 106(6).
52.
See infra Part III.C.
53.
See infra Part III.C.
54.
17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012).
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organizations can include performances of nondramatic literary or
musical compositions in their social functions, so long as they donate
any profits to charity.55
Disparities like those mentioned above might give little cause
for alarm, if not for the capacity of the copyright system to chill
desirable expression.56 Copyright protection is economic regulation, a
limited monopoly that gives authors and owners of copyrighted
expression exclusive rights to make or authorize public performance or
display of the expression,57 as well as exclusive rights to copy,
distribute, or make new adaptations of copyrighted expression.58
Exercising these rights without the permission of the copyright owner
can trigger both criminal and civil liability,59 and statutory damages for
civil infringement can reach $150,000 per work infringed.60
Additionally, courts frequently grant preliminary and permanent
injunctions against unauthorized users,61 even though the Court
generally considers speech-restricting preliminary injunctions
unconstitutional “prior restraints.”62 Thus, granting copyright

55.
Id. § 110(10) (specifically excluding college fraternities and sororities).
56.
See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's ‘Total Concept and Feel’, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 423–33 (1989).
57.
17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(6) (2012).
58.
Id. § 106(1)–(3).
59.
Id. § 501 (violating the rights under § 106 infringes copyright protection, and subjects
the violator to civil remedies under 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505); id. § 506 (criminalizing willful copyright
infringement).
60.
Id. § 504(c) (describing statutory damages as a remedy for copyright infringement).
61.
See id. § 502; see also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165 (1998); Volokh, supra note 39, at
2459.
62.
The fact that private actors bring copyright complaints does not bar the application
of First Amendment scrutiny on the ground that the First Amendment does not apply to private
individuals. If the application of the remedies of copyright protection restricts First Amendment
freedoms, the action of the courts is the action of the federal government. For example, the Court
held, in Cohen v. Cowles Media, that the First Amendment would apply to a state court’s
enforcement of a promissory estoppel claim, because promissory estoppel is a state-law doctrine
creating legal obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties, but enforceable through the
official power of the state’s courts. See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991). Likewise,
in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court held that a civil lawsuit between private parties could
impose invalid restrictions on the First Amendment freedoms of one of the parties. See New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). While the Court has not explicitly addressed it, the
exercise of federal power pursuant to the Copyright Act that allows a copyright owner to bring a
private action in federal court and secure an injunction against otherwise protectable behavior
would also amount to state action, and potentially trigger First Amendment protections. David
McGowan argues that the First Amendment provides no justification for dealing with disputes
between authors. David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65
U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 285 (2004). But when Congress sets baseline rules that preference one
institutional group over another, it is troubling to conclude that the playing field has been leveled
in a way that satisfies speaker-neutral First Amendment restrictions on government activity.
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protection to the author of an expressive work allows the author to
restrict subsequent uses of the work.63
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the speech-restrictive
potential of copyright protection in articulating its rationale for not
applying heightened First Amendment scrutiny in two recent cases that
challenged amendments to the Copyright Act.64 In Eldred v. Ashcroft,
the Court rebuffed a challenge to a twenty-year extension to the term
of copyright protection, concluding it was unnecessary to apply
searching First Amendment review.65 The Court supported its
conclusion by focusing on the two “traditional contours” of copyright law
encoded in the Copyright Act—the idea-expression dichotomy that
prevents Congress from extending copyright protection to ideas,66 and
the fair use defense, which allows some uses of protected works without
securing the author’s permission or paying the author a royalty.67 The
Court noted that Congressional action that altered those traditional
contours would trigger First Amendment scrutiny.68 In Golan v.
Holder, the Court rejected another First Amendment challenge to a
statute that restored copyright protection to the works of foreign
authors that had fallen into the public domain, on the ground that
Congress left “undisturbed the ‘idea/expression’ distinction and the ‘fair
use’ defense.”69
Thus, the Court expressly recognized two elements of the
Copyright Act that may not be altered without triggering First
63.
See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4
n.12 (1987) (allowing the author “to control access to the copyrighted work” once it is published “is
the essence of censorship”).
64.
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture, UCLA School of
Law, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082,
1086 (2013) [hereinafter Netanel, Constraints After Golan].
65.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations” allowing free use of ideas and providing a fair use defense,
which “affords considerable ‘latitude for scholarship and comment’”) (citing and quoting Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). Both the idea-expression
dichotomy and the fair use provision are also described as implementations of Progress Clause
values. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1166
(2000); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988);
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1982).
66.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (copyright assures authors
the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by their work).
67.
The fair use defense is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See also Golan, 132 S. Ct.
at 890.
68.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. See also Netanel, Constraints After Golan, supra note 64, at
1086.
69.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91.
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Amendment scrutiny. Additionally, scholars and jurists argue that the
Copyright Act is properly subject to more fulsome First Amendment
constraints.70 In light of the potential chilling effects of copyright
protection, it is puzzling that the Copyright Act—filled to the brim with
rights that certain groups of copyright owners but not others can
exercise, limitations on the rights of a subset of copyright owners that
do not fall upon the majority, and defenses accessible only by certain
institutional groups—is treated by the Court as consistent with First
Amendment values as articulated in cases like Citizens United and
Mosley.
If the Copyright Act has speech-restricting effects,71 one might
wonder how courts should apply First Amendment standards to
evaluate this speaker-based institutional tailoring. If the First
Amendment provides any substantive limitations on the scope of
granted copyright protection, can it tolerate the systematic disparity in
speaker-based grants of both exclusive rights and defenses against
those rights? One potentially drastic response is “No.” If the Court
cannot permit Congress to restrict political advertising by corporations,
may it allow Congress to restore copyright protection to the authors and
owners of foreign works whose works fell out of protection because of a
failure to observe now-invalid formalities, while denying that
restoration to authors and owners of works created by American
domiciliaries?72 If the Court applied strict scrutiny to every speaker-

70.
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that speech related harms
caused by restoring copyright protection to works by foreign authors “show the presence of a First
Amendment interest” sufficiently important “to require courts to scrutinize with some care the
reasons claimed to justify the Act in order to determine whether they constitute reasonable
copyright-related justifications for the serious harms, including speech-related harms, which the
Act seems likely to impose.”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
extension of copyright protection would cause “serious expression-related harm” without any
“benefit [to] the public”); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 61, at 169 (citing Martin H. Redish, The
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984)).
71.
See Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 (2010); Sigmund
Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 NW. U.
L. REV. 193, 229 (1980); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that
the scope of Congress’s legislative power must be discerned by reading the Copyright Clause “in
light of the First Amendment”).
72.
This Article does not address the major differential treatment in the Copyright Act,
which grants the author the exclusive right to copy, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, and
publicly display the work, while the public may generally copy, adapt, distribute, publicly perform,
or publicly display a copyrighted work only when the author grants permission. There is also a
difference, here, between statutory grants and exceptions, which are the subject of this article, and
fair use, which is not. Fair use is the backstop to every exclusive right granted by the Copyright
Act, but when one starts from a position where one activity falls outside the copyright grant, and
the other doesn’t unless a fair use defense applies, the first activity will occur more often, and be
subject to less potential chilling than the latter.
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based inequality in the Copyright Act, there would be little Copyright
Act left.
One might also argue that copyrighted expression and its
alleged infringement are sufficiently distant from the core of First
Amendment values that any potential slippage from speaker-based to
content- or viewpoint-based effects is inconsequential.73 That argument
is problematic for at least two reasons. First, from 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island to Sorrell v. IMS, the Court has collapsed the
boundaries between commercial and political speech.74 Second,
sometimes the most effective political speech is grounded upon
commercially valuable copyrighted expression. For example, Alice
Randall appropriated the characters of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with
the Wind in her novel The Wind Done Gone, which cast as heroes the
slaves on Mitchell’s fictional plantations.75 By criticizing a book that
romanticizes the antebellum South, Randall challenged America’s
racist past.76 Her goal was simultaneously political and expressive.77
Granting authors like Mitchell the ability to silence critiques like The
Wind Done Gone would reduce access to viewpoints unpopular to
copyright owners, some of which will be as close to the core of political
speech as electioneering.78
It might be sensible to try to avoid constitutional questions
entirely, and some institutional tailoring is justified under traditional
economic rationales.79 For instance, Joseph Liu notes that the

73.
See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 814–16 (1999) (arguing that an intratextual analysis of
constitutional text would properly limit the First Amendment injunction that Congress shall make
no laws abridging freedom of speech to Congressional action that restricts political discourse).
74.
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 484 (1996); see, e.g., Fazal
Khan & Justin Holloway, Verify, Then Trust: How to Legalize Off-Label Drug Marketing, 117 PENN
ST. L. REV. 407, 439 (2012) (“[I]t appears [in light of Citizens United and Sorrell] that the Court is
fundamentally rethinking the lower level of protection afforded to commercial speech under
Central Hudson.”).
75.
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
76.
See, e.g., David Roh, Two Copyright Case Studies from a Literary Perspective, 22 L. &
LIT. 110 (2010).
77.
As Henry Louis Gates stated in support of Randall, The Wind Done Gone “constitutes
both an original work of art and a moving act of political commentary, deconstructing as it does a
text that many scholars believe to be racist.” Declaration of Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ¶ 7, Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP),
available
at
http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com/features/
randall_url/pdf/Declaration_Henry_Louis_Gates.pdf.
78.
Cf. Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 253
(1997) (“Tyrannical governments have long attempted either to suppress art or to channel it into
politically correct themes and statements.”).
79.
Economic theory is frequently used to critique or justify the scope of copyright
protection. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
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increasingly complex institutional tailoring in the Copyright Act
indicates that Congress is intervening “more substantially into the
nature and structure of copyright markets, as opposed to leaving these
details to the market.”80 Michael Carroll argues the economic case that
uniform protection for copyrights is often inefficient, necessitating some
type of differentiation among copyright owners to reduce uniformity
costs.81
While neither Liu nor Carroll tackle the First Amendment
implications of industry-specific copyright law, they acknowledge that
different institutional groups in the copyright can require different
levels of protection.82 Such differential treatment may provide better
clarity, at least for those regulated parties.83 It may also cure market
failures and bring relative parties to the bargaining table with each
other, or members of Congress.84
Complexity presents downsides, however, including increased
statutory complexity, decreased transparency, increased lobbying,85
and perhaps too much deference to a Congress that is too busy
fund-raising to take seriously its role as a constitutional gatekeeper.86
As Neil Netanel and Jessica Litman have argued, certain interest
groups can regularly and reliably turn to Congress for special benefits.87
Congress’s expansion of protections under the Copyright Act has
inspired criticism that industries that benefit from broad copyright
protections have captured the legislative body.88 It may thus be
reasonable, in light of that dynamic, to distrust any manifestation of
disparate treatment in the language of the Copyright Act.89 While there
80.
Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 105 (2004).
81.
See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1389–94 (2009).
82.
See Liu, supra note 80, at 153; Carroll, supra note 81, at 1364.
83.
See Liu, supra note 80, at 134.
84.
See id.
85.
See id.
86.
See generally LARRY LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS –
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); Oliar, supra note 2, at 1830 (noting the Court’s review in Eldred
was “characterized by substantial deference to Congress’s subjective judgment”).
87.
See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857, 869–79 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, Compromise]; Netanel, First Amendment Skein,
supra note 4, at 67.
88.
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 20, at 67 (arguing that in setting the threshold for
Congressional activity that affects speech, “if the standard is too low, interest groups may capture
the legislature and overprotect some speech at the expense of other speech,” which Tushnet argues
happened during the recent extensions of copyright protection).
89.
See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 134–35 (2012) (“Even when
legislators are dedicated to service the public interest, much of the information they receive comes
from interest groups seeking to maximize their own welfare.”); Mark A. Lemley, The
Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532 (2000) (“Congress in
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are reasonable arguments in favor of institutional tailoring on economic
grounds,90 constitutional values are sufficiently important that
economic rationales alone cannot justify the institutional tailoring in
the Copyright Act.91
While the Court has resisted speaker-based tailoring in its
Speech Clause jurisprudence, there may be justifications for
preferential treatment grounded in other constitutional provisions. For
example, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Court recently held that the
Free Expression Clause of the First Amendment extends “special
solicitude” to the rights of religious institutions.92 The Court’s holding
in Hosanna-Tabor failed to define religious institutions, leaving
scholars the challenge of creating a framework for determining which
religious institutions qualify for that special solicitude.93 This Article
undertakes a similar goal in the copyright context, identifying
characteristics that institutions particularly deserving of solicitude
under the Progress Clause may possess.
II. PROGRESS CLAUSE VALUES
As discussed above, speaker-based tailoring of speech
protections has met with a chilly reception in the Supreme Court.94
However, such disparate treatment may nevertheless be
constitutionally permissible, so long as Congress picks the right
institutions for favorable treatment. Constitutional scholars have
argued that courts should handle First Amendment inquiries along
institutional lines by identifying institutions that promote speech
values or externalize valuable speech in their typical operations and

recent years seems to have abdicated its role in setting intellectual property policy to the private
interests who appear before it.”).
90.
See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the
Best Incentive System, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECONOMY 51, 71 (2002). Scholars have also noted
that the institutional tailoring in the Copyright Act may better assign rights ex ante to the parties
best able to exploit them, see Carroll, supra note 81, at 1361, 1364, or increase clarity for regulated
parties. See Liu, supra note 80, at 134. While economic analysis generally does not consider
constitutional limits on institutional tailoring, it does suggest that not all instances of institutional
tailoring lead to pernicious effects, or necessarily stem from misguided goals.
91.
Cf. Reece v. Gragg, 650 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (D. Kan. 1986) (“[The] economic motive
[of stretching inadequate prison resources] is an impermissible justification for the resulting
constitutional violations.”).
92.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n
132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012); see also generally Robinson, supra note 15.
93.
Id.; see also infra Part III.A.
94.
See supra Part I.A.
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ensuring that Congress does not abridge the ability of those institutions
to contribute to our general speech infrastructure.95
Advocates for institutional tailoring of the First Amendment
suggest that these lines should be drawn to favor “group[s] or
organization[s] whose recognized function [is] to obtain information for
the purpose of public dissemination.”96 Thus, an institutionally driven
First Amendment regime would best promote speech values if courts
could clearly identify institutions that serve as “repositor[ies] for
certain constitutionally important values” and the extent to which
“protecting those institutions would have the tendency to serve those
values.”97 Well-drawn institutional lines could provide safe harbors
against chilling valuable speech provided or intermediated by those
institutional actors who can rely on their preferred First Amendment
status.98 That in turn could allow courts to decide some cases earlier,
potentially lowering litigation costs for First Amendment institutions.99
It might also make courts more sensitive and responsive to the context
in which public discourse occurs.100
While the Court to date has not embraced special treatment of
institutions under the Speech or Press Clauses, it has applied a
ministerial exception, drawn from the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment, to insulate the hiring decisions of
religious institutions from governmental regulation.101 While extending
these privileges to religious institutions can run counter to principles of
speech neutrality,102 the decision to do so is grounded in other

95.
See generally HORWITZ, supra note 9; Schauer, Categories, supra note 12. Schauer
suggests that these institutions will merit First Amendment solicitude because of characteristics
that are “prelegal” or “extralegal,” existing regardless of legal rules. Id. at 1748–49.
96.
Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards
a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 350–51 (2004)
(suggesting that journalists, academic or scientific researchers employed by universities or the
government, and researchers employed by public policy groups or think tanks would qualify).
97.
Schauer, Categories, supra note 12, at 1764. Paul Horwitz argues that First
Amendment institutions are institutions which occupy a stable, central place in public discourse,
and that engage in self-regulatory practices that arguably merit deference from courts. See
HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 15; Horwitz, Grutter’s, supra note 12, at 589.
98.
See e.g., Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256, 1268 & n.63 (2005) [hereinafter Schaeur, Towards] (“[A]n institutional account of the
First Amendment might yield more of a genuine privilege (that is, immunity from an otherwise
applicable requirement, analogous to a reporter's privilege) of academic freedom than now exists
in current doctrine.”).
99.
See id.
100.
See HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 92.
101.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012).
102.
Cf. Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351,
1353 (2012) (noting that the Government argued in Hosanna-Tabor “that religious groups are not
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constitutional
values
co-equal
with
the
speaker-neutrality principle drawn from the Speech Clause.
Core principles can be similarly drawn from the text and history
of the Progress Clause,103 which can aid in identifying institutions that
might reasonably merit preferential treatment. Indeed, the Progress
Clause grants Congress specific authority subject to substantive limits,
both in its requirement that exclusive rights last for limited times and
its overarching purpose that exclusive rights are secured to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”104 The Progress Clause rests
on three overlapping values—incentivizing creation and dissemination,
expanding knowledge, and providing public access.
“Progress
institutions” that externalize these values may merit particularly
solicitous treatment under the Copyright Act.105
A. The Progress Clause as a Substantive Limit on Congressional
Authority
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution—which includes the
Progress Clause—spells out the enumerated powers of Congress and
provides it with the authority to enact laws “necessary and proper” to
exercise those powers.106 Congress’s core regulatory power stems from
the Commerce Clause.107 The Progress Clause provides Congress with
a specific—but limited—power to craft protection for copyrighted
expression and patented inventions. Specifically, it authorizes Congress
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”108
Some scholars, like Professor Nimmer, have argued that the
“progress” phrase is merely a preamble that provides no substantive
limit on congressional authority.109 Others, like Thomas Nachbar, have
argued instead that the progress requirement is too ambiguous to

entitled to protections beyond those available to nonreligious expressive associations under the
Free Speech Clause”).
103.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
104.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see infra Part II.A.
105.
See infra Parts II.B.–II.D.
106.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
107.
Id. cl. 3.
108.
Id. cl. 8.
109.
See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A]
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (“[T]he phrase ‘To promote the progress of science and useful arts …’
must be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not
in limitation of its exercise.’”).
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justify judicial intervention,110 or that the concept of progress denies
definition and thus provides courts with too little guidance to overturn
congressional regulation in the intellectual property space.111
It is, however, the work of courts to provide meaning for
ambiguous or uncertain constitutional language.112 Arguing that the
Progress Clause provides no substantive limit is problematic precisely
because such an argument ignores the unique structure of the
Intellectual Property Clause. That structure makes the clause the sole
Article I, Section 8 power that describes a particular means to
accomplish its particular end: promoting progress through an exclusive
grant to authors and inventors.113 Likewise, to construe the “progress”
phrase as merely preambular makes a nullity of constitutional
language. Reading the progress requirement out of the Clause thus
runs afoul of the principles of constitutional interpretation that the
Court employs.114
More critically, one must understand what the Intellectual
Property Clause empowers Congress to do. Compare the Intellectual
Property Clause with the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause of
Section 8 grants Congress power “to regulate Commerce.”115 The power
granted under the Intellectual Property Clause is not the power to
secure an exclusive right to authors and inventors,116 but the power “[t]o

110.

See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J.
HIGH TECH L. 33, 55 (2003) (arguing that calls to treat the public choice problems
in creating copyright law as unique are a misguided attempt to “respond to a problem with
representative government by discarding it”).
111.
See id. at 67 (“Application of the Progress Phrase involves a nested imponderable: Not
only is the net effect on progress of virtually any change in the copyright law imponderable, but
the very nature of progress is itself imponderable.”).
112.
See e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 528 (1972) (noting the difficulty in
defining or construing the boundaries of the right to a speedy trial, but nevertheless providing a
test for assessing the point at which the right to a speedy trial must be asserted or waived).
113.
Compare Nachbar, supra note 110, at 55 (“Other than an awkwardly worded clause
in the Constitution to provide a textual hook, what makes copyright so special?”), with Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 44 IDEA
331, 378 (2004) (“If the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison have any meaning,
then the phrase ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ in the Science and Useful
Arts Clause cannot be merely a meaningless preamble.” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that these limits may not
be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written.”))).
114.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(“The clause is not an open grant of power to secure exclusive rights. It is a grant of a power to
promote progress.”); see also Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1160–66 (arguing that limitations
on Congressional activities taken pursuant to its respective Section 8 enumerated powers must be
grounded in the justification for that power).
115.
U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
116.
Id. cl. 8.
ON TELECOM &
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promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”117 And the power to
promote the progress of science is by definition narrower than the power
to regulate commerce.118
One might accept the limiting function of the Progress Clause
and still be concerned about the difficulties posed by institutional
line-drawing regimes more generally. Like other line-drawing or
rule-creating regimes, an institutional framework could be both
over- and underinclusive. Some members of an institutional group
might fall short in externalizing constitutional values.119 Likewise,
some actors that externalize constitutional values might be left without
certain privileges because they cannot be slotted into a particular
institutional frame.120
In addition, to the extent institutional line drawing requires
identifying an “existing social institution” with “moderately
identifiable” boundaries,121 it is important to recognize those
identifiable boundaries may be due as much to legal structures as any
prelegal reality.122 For example, Aereo offers subscribers access to a
remote antenna that captures broadcast signals and reroutes them to
the subscriber’s compatible device for viewing.123 The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari and will soon determine whether Aereo’s services

117.
Id. But see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 93 (1997) (arguing that the Intellectual Property Clause does not confer “a
general power to ‘promote the progress of science and the useful arts,’ but only the power to grant
limited exclusive rights in order to accomplish that goal”).
118.
See e.g., Oliar, supra note 2, at 1844 (“[T]he ‘progress’ language in the Clause provides
a textual basis for the negation of the implication that the power to ‘promote’ progress implies the
grant of power to ‘retard’ progress of arts and sciences.”); see also Jake Linford, A Second Look at
the Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 595–604 (2011) [hereinafter
Linford, First Publication] (critiquing the Court’s limited view of the Progress Clause
requirement).
119.
Cf. Joshua G. Hazan, Note, Stop Being Evil: A Proposal for Unbiased Google Search,
111 MICH. L. REV. 789, 792, 819 (arguing that while Google “spearheaded the net neutrality
movement,” its own behavior “has begun to threaten the very openness and diversity it once
championed”).
120.
See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1058–
60 (2011) (noting that accepting special protection for an institutional press might leave some
actors without Press Clause protections, but arguing the Speech Clause provides a sufficient
backstop to minimize the concern); see also HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 168–69 (arguing that instead
of expanding the definition of institutional press to include bloggers, we “should define blogs’
institutional autonomy in a way that is appropriate to [their] unique institutional features and
practices”); RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a
Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 612 (2011) (arguing that even if
disaggregated media entities can provide the public with news, those entities “are unlikely to take
on all of the roles [like litigating to shape and enforce free speech law] that newspapers once
unitarily played in American society.”).
121.
Schauer, Towards, supra note 98, at 1275.
122.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
123.
About Aereo, AEREO, https://aereo.com/about (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
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violate a provision of the Copyright Act.124 The particular structure of
Aereo’s features, however, appear to have been made to qualify for a
safe harbor from copyright liability carved out for a similar service by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Cartoon
Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc.125 The development of Aereo’s business
mode seems to be driven as much by legal constraints as by
technological capacity or consumer need.126
It is true that an institutional review framework cannot catch
every problematic change in the Copyright Act.127 In some cases,
institutional or speaker-based tailoring might be preferable than some
speaker-neutral provisions of the Copyright Act.128 Finally, there is at
least some danger that a line-drawing regime based on institutions
could make the wrong determination and create bright lines within
which “courts allow heavy speech restrictions and defer to government
officials.”129
But while the institutional framework is no panacea for all that
ails copyright law, it is nevertheless a clear step in the right direction.
As this Article details more fully in Part IV, the application of some
level of searching review would kick-start a more productive
conversation about the values our copyright policy should embody.130 In

124.
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom.
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) (No. 13-461) (mem.).
125.
See The Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2d
Cir. 2008).
126.
James Grimmelmann, Copyright Arbitrage in Action, THE LABORATORIUM (Mar. 4,
2012, 1:00 PM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2012/03/04/copyright_arbitrage_in_action.
127.
The Work Made For Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 included a
“housekeeping” amendment that added sound recordings to the list of works that could be works
made for hire, even though the author was not an employee. This change would have hamstrung
efforts by recording artists to terminate transfers of copyrighted works to record labels. Mary
LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 410
(2002). The amendment was considered problematic at the time, and almost immediately repealed,
but it would not have triggered heightened constitutional scrutiny under the institutional review
framework proposed by this Article.
128.
For example, the Copyright Term Extension Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)–(c)
[hereinafter CTEA], added twenty years to the term of both existing works and works not yet
created. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Some critics argued that disparate
treatment was more consistent with progress or speech values than uniformity, and uniform
extension of the copyright term was the signal that something was rotten in the CTEA. See, e.g.,
Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 15, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
01-618) (“Comparing the main economic benefits and costs of the CTEA, it is difficult to understand
[copyright]
term
extension
for
both
existing
and
new
works
as
an
efficiency-enhancing measure.”).
129.
Scott Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About
Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635 1658–59
(2007) (finding that relative to three institutions—public schools, workplaces, and prisons—
institutional line drawing has led to problematic heightened deference).
130.
See infra Part IV.
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addition, evaluating the preferential treatment in the Copyright Act
with an eye to locating progress institutions will lead to copyright laws
more in harmony with their constitutional justification.
The remainder of this Part discusses three overlapping
goals—incentivizing creation and dissemination, expanding knowledge,
and providing public access—that copyright protection must serve if it
is to meet the agenda set by the Framers in the Progress Clause.131 And
just as certain institutions may be particularly well-suited to promote
the values underlying the Speech Clauses, some institutions, in their
typical operation, are well-placed to promote the fundamental purposes
of the Progress Clause.132 Those three core values drawn from the text
and the historical context of the Progress Clause provide some
indication of institutions that might merit special solicitude because, in
their typical operation, they provide public benefits commensurate with
one or more of these values.133
B. Promoting Progress by Incentivizing Creation and Dissemination
The exclusive right Congress grants to authors is often described
as public facing, i.e., “the ultimate aim” of allowing an author to “secure
a fair return” on her “creative labor” is “to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good.”134 As reported by Edward Walterscheid,
the Framers saw Congress’s authority to promote progress as a narrow
power, limited to securing an exclusive right to authors and inventors
in their writings and discoveries.135 For example, James Madison was
131.
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814, 1856, n.118 (2011) [hereinafter Gordon, License Fees] (noting that even
if “Progress” is left undefined, one can make “preliminary assessments” about whether potential
changes to the Act are consistent with the Progress clause); see also Oliar, supra note 2, at 1836
(“‘Progress,’ of course, is not a clearly defined concept. It would not be straightforward, and it would
perhaps even be difficult, for courts to determine which grants of intellectual property rights
‘promote[] progress.’”).
132.
See infra Part II.E.
133.
See infra Part II.E.
134.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
135.
See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the
Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 104–05 (1999) [hereinafter Walterscheid,
General Welfare]; see also Jeanne C. Fromer The Intellectual Property Clause’s External
Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1332 (2012) (arguing that both the textual structure and historical
application of the Intellectual Property Clause bars Congress from using means other than
securing an exclusive right to others and inventors to promote the specified end of promoting the
progress of science and useful arts). But see Walterscheid, General Welfare, supra, at 102–03
(arguing that Alexander Hamilton may have had the better of the argument that Congress had
the power, pursuant to the General Welfare Clause, to pay directly for research and development);
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and
Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL PROP. L. 1,
32–33 (1994) (“The Clause was intended not so much as an express authority to promote the
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convinced that Congress perceived itself as tied down: “to the single
mode of encouraging inventions by granting the exclusive benefit of
them for a limited time.”136 This relatively narrow reading suggests
that Congress was empowered to provide for the public good in the
copyright context by providing a means to incentivize creative labor
through profitable dissemination. Seeking “the promotion of progress”
through a grant of exclusive rights to authors is consistent both with
the prehistory of the Progress Clause and what little we can glean from
the Constitutional Convention and contemporary sources about its
adoption.
The historical antecedents of the Constitution and the first
federal copyright act in the United States illustrate the Framer’s view
that an exclusive right—and the profit it secures—was designed to
motivate creative expression.137 The Statute of Anne, England’s first
copyright act, was ostensibly crafted “for the encouragement of
learning” by preventing the printing of books “without the consent of
the authors or proprietors.”138 In other words, Britain would promote
knowledge by using exclusive rights to “encourage . . . learned men to
compose and write useful books.”139
The committee of the Continental Congress in charge of
suggesting what type of copyright protection states might reasonably
grant instead embraced a natural rights rationale.140 The committee
progress of science and the useful arts, but rather as a means of ensuring authority to do so in a
particular way . . . .”).
136.
See Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (Mar. 21, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, 128 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1981).
137.
See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (“The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor. But
the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156));
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) “[C]opyright law
celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge. . . . The
profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”); Bruce Abramson, Promoting
Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform,
8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 93–94 (2002) (“Most people looking for an investment venue will choose
to put their time, effort, and/or capital into tangible property that can be resold at a
personal profit rather than into ideas that will benefit society at large but whose promised personal
returns are limited. . . . IP rights thus represent a societal attempt to harness the profit motive in
order to motivate innovation.”); Zi Wong, The Experimental Stage Doctrine: The Quiet Death of an
Experimental Use Heresy, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 691, 692 (2000).
138.
The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). For a more detailed discussion of the
relationship between authors and stationers in the period leading up to the passage of the Statute
of Anne and its subsequent enforcement, see Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 635.
139.
The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
140.
The historical record suggests that the Committee took testimony only from authors,
which may make this an early example of successful interest group lobbying to secure copyright
protection. But see Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection
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concluded that “nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of
his study.” But as often occurs, the natural rights rationale bled into
utilitarian goals.141 The committee noted that “the protection and
security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius
[and] to promote useful discoveries.”142 And those states that extended
copyright protection to their citizens primarily modeled their statutes
on the Statute of Anne, which ostensibly protected the author’s profit
incentive rather than an identity-based moral right.143 Some of the
proffered language, however, reflected a Lockean concept of natural
rights.144
The limited historical record from the Constitutional Convention
suggests that the Framers were convinced that there was a relationship
between the grant of an exclusive right and the stimulation of desired
output. In addition to the language of the Progress Clause, the
Constitutional Convention contemplated direct subsidies to
universities or artists.145 For example, the Convention considered
empowering Congress to “establish a University,” or “establish
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and sciences.”146
Those direct subsidies were ultimately not included in the Progress
Clause,147 an omission that was likely intentional.148
of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 519–20 (1981) (“Notions of a natural right to
the fruit of one’s labor, and of the injustice of the enrichment that falls to the taker are as much a
part of copyright as the careful balancing of incentive and dissemination.”).
141.
See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 211 (entry for May 2, 1783).
142.
See id. at 326–27, cited by Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?:
Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing
the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 783–84, n.147 (2001).
143.
See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning
the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 933 n.61 (2003) (“The state statutes were directed at the
protection of authors' profits, rather than any moral rights she or he might have. The author, while
the focus of the statutes, could pass the right to profit by publishing and vending to heirs or
assigns.”).
144.
See, e.g., ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 236 (Boston
1781–1783):
Whereas the Improvement of Knowledge, the Progress of Civilization, the public Weal
of the Community, and the Advancement of Human Happiness, greatly depend of the
Efforts of learned and ingenious Persons in the various Arts and Sciences: As the
principal Encouragement such Persons can have to make great and beneficial Exertions
of this Nature must exist in the legal Security of the Fruits of their Study and Industry
to themselves; and as such Security is one of the natural Rights of all Men, there being
no Property more peculiarly a Man's own than that which is produced by the Labour of
his Mind.
145.
See Oliar, supra note 2, at 1777.
146.
See e.g., id. at 1789.
147.
Id. at 1792–93 (noting that Congress rejected President Washington’s call to establish
a university, and proposing that the decision not to include the power to establish a university
meant the Framers intended not to provide that power).
148.
Id. at 1792.
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There are no records about why the Constitutional Convention
selected the language chosen, but James Madison embraced individual
protection of copyrighted expression as necessary for the public good.149
Madison asserted, “the public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of
individuals.”150 And in one public essay, Madison equated control over
one’s thoughts as a property right in the same way that control over
one’s real estate was a property right—both necessary for a properly
functioning government.151 Finally, when the first Congress passed the
Copyright Act of 1790, the Act looked much like the aforementioned
Statute of Anne—“[a]n Act for the encouragement of learning,”
accomplished “by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the
authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned.”152
This rough glimpse of the historical background of the Framers’
views gives some general guidance regarding the “progress of science
and useful arts” that copyright protection must promote. As Dotan
Oliar has noted, the decision to limit Congressional scope to securing
exclusive rights to authors and inventors was most likely intentional.153
Jeanne Fromer has concluded that Congress may not promote progress
in any way other than securing exclusive rights to authors.154 Given
the centrality of the exclusive right to the constitutional text, for
progress to have meaning in light of that text, it must be progress that
can be promoted by securing exclusive rights for authors to their
writings. The Progress Clause, and the Copyright Act enacted to
accomplish its goals, envisioned an exclusive right to incentivize the
creation and distribution of new expression.155 The author is not
rewarded in the abstract for her efforts but for her creative output—
and even then only to the extent she can find a (paying) audience
149.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
150.
Id. at 272. But see Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 771 (2001) (arguing that
Madison misunderstood or misrepresented English precedent of the day, and that Madison did not
embrace a natural rights justification for copyright protection).
151.
James Madison, Property, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION Ch. 16, Doc. 23 (2000)
(originally dated Mar. 29, 1792) (“[A] man has a property in his opinions and the free
communication of them.”), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
v1ch16s23.html.
152.
Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
153.
See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text.
154.
See Fromer, supra note 135 at 1332 (arguing that “[t]he IP Clause’s text and
placement within the constitutional structure suggest that Congress” may only promote progress
by “securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries” and may promote progress by no other means).
155.
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
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receptive to it.156 Exclusive rights of some sort must therefore be a part
of the US copyright system.
To conclude otherwise would do
considerable harm to the constitutional language.
C. Promoting Progress by Expanding Knowledge
The Progress Clause is also boundary defining. The accepted
wisdom is that it protects only two distinct types of addition to human
knowledge: inventions, which receive patent protection, and writings,
which receive copyright protection.157 The category of writings that
qualify for protection today is much broader than those protected by the
Copyright Act of 1790.158 Nevertheless, the Progress Clause builds in a
natural limit recognized by the courts, as articulated in the
idea-expression dichotomy.159 Some things fall outside of both copyright
and patent protection, and are free for all to use.160 Congress may not
grant perpetual protection, so that the authors’ writings are eventually
released to the public.161 The public can freely exploit, reproduce, and
resell works for which protection has expired at their marginal cost of
reproduction.162
Through both its subject matter limitations and the grant of an
exclusive right only for limited times, the Progress Clause provides a
substrate of freely accessible material on which any person can build
his or her own creative expression or novel invention.163 This substrate,
often called “the public domain,” is comprised of information that once
was protected as intellectual property and information that may never
156.
See id.
157.
See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 887–88 (2012) (“Perhaps counterintuitively
for the contemporary reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its
patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.”); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94
(1879) (holding that federal trademark protection cannot be justified under the Progress Clause
because unlike copyright or patent protection, securing trademark rights does not “depend upon
novelty, invention, discovery,” but only upon “priority of appropriation”).
158.
Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012), with Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
159.
See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1879); see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
160.
See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 294 (1996) (defining the public
domain as “the works and uses that are free for all to use”).
161.
See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (noting
that Congress may not “create[] a species of perpetual patent [or] copyright”).
162.
This marginal cost nears zero in the Internet age.
163.
See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347,
368 (2005); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885, 887
(1992) (“Because knowledge, technology, and culture advance by building on an existing base, too
much protection for particular works can inhibit social progress rather than enhance it. One object
of the game, at least insofar as it is based on incentive theories, is to determine where the
protective lines are optimally drawn.”).
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be protected as intellectual property.164 While this description might
suggest that the public domain is an essential part of the constitutional
scheme outlined in the Progress Clause, the Supreme Court in Golan v.
Holder indicated that the concept of a public domain held little
constitutional significance.165
As discussed above, the Progress Clause’s statutory
predecessors provided an exclusive right to authors and inventors, in
part to increase the available store of knowledge.166 Founding-era state
copyright statutes expressed goals like “the improvement of knowledge,
the progress of civilization, and the advancement of human
happiness.”167 Promoting the progress of science and useful arts might
thus be effectively reducible to “encouragement of learning.”168
The Supreme Court has articulated a fairly low Constitutional
threshold for “creative” or “original” expression,169 and thus, increasing
creative expression is not necessarily the same thing as increasing
knowledge.170 Scholars disagree whether the Progress Clause requires
an increase in quality of the knowledge base,171 a numerical increase in
new inputs into the knowledge base,172 or the value of the knowledge
base judged economically,173 but many argue that copyright protection

164.
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)
(“Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be
copyrighted.”).
165.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 n.26 (2012) (dismissing the argument that
copyright legislation that restores protection to works in the public domain must also provide new
incentives to create, “[e]ven assuming the public domain were a category of constitutional
significance”); see also Lyle Denniston, From Plyler v. Doe to Trayvon Martin: Toward Closing the
Open Society, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1815 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court essentially
destroyed–at least in constitutional terms–the concept of a ‘public domain.’”).
166.
See supra notes 137–142 and accompanying text; see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 89, at ix (defining “innovation” as “any human idea that adds something important to
what we already have”).
167.
See Oliar, supra note 2, at 1807.
168.
See Lawrence Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002).
169.
See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (“The standard of originality is low, but it does exist.”).
170.
Cf. Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. REV. 259
(arguing that “Science,” as used in the Progress Clause, means a system of knowledge comprising
distinct branches of study, and in light of that meaning, Congress may not be empowered to extend
copyright protection to expression that the First Amendment does not protect).
171.
See Fromer, supra note 135, at 1374 (stating that a law promotes progress “if it seeks
to encourage advancement in areas of systematic knowledge, including cultural knowledge or
technology.”); Solum, supra note 168, at 57 (proposing that the question to ask, before any statute
is enacted is whether it will “encourage systematic knowledge and learning of enduring value?”).
172.
See Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1163.
173.
Compare Fromer, supra note 135, at 1373, with Pollack, supra note 143, at 756. But
see Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1163 (noting that the “quid pro quo” principle they locate in
the constitutional text “does not authorize a court to invalidate legislation simply because it does
not increase wealth”).
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is justified only when the protection results in an advance in knowledge,
however defined.174
In fact, the Progress Clause’s discernable focus on increasing
knowledge has led some scholars to question whether the Framers
would have been interested in the creation of the entertainment tent
poles that currently drive much of Congress’s legislative agenda with
regard to copyright protection.175 An increase in knowledge, properly
defined, may be limited to an increase in things that are inherently
valuable.176 Under this view, copyright protection for books as artifacts
that promote the progress of science might be overinclusive if it protects
copyrights in trashy literature, but would nevertheless be justifiable so
long as an increase of knowledge was the end goal, not just a side
benefit.177 There is danger, however, in trying to protect only works of
a certain artistic or cultural value.178 While many scholars recognize
the importance of the collective increase in knowledge, some suggest
that intellectual property protection was always too blunt a policy
instrument to promote “innovation and cultural progress.”179
Despite the challenge of such line drawing, as Justin Hughes has
identified, it is not far a stretch to conclude the “primary objective of
intellectual property” is “to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts’ by increasing society’s stock of knowledge.”180 Institutions that
play a central role in cataloging and categorizing that stock of
knowledge, broadly defined, might therefore merit special solicitude.
D. Promoting Progress by Providing Access
The Supreme Court has stated that ensuring access to
copyrighted expression is the primary goal of copyright protection.181
Some scholars suggest that the access aspect of the Progress Clause
requires maximizing the broadest possible dissemination of
copyrightable expression.182 Under that definition, any change in
copyright protection would be merited only to the extent that it
“increase[s] public access to writings.”183 But a commitment to

174.
See e.g., Oliar, supra note 2, at 1801 n.191.
175.
See Solum, Power, supra note 168, at 54.
176.
See Snow, supra note 170, at 264.
177.
See, e.g., Solum, Power, supra note 168, at 57–59.
178.
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Corp., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
179.
See Carroll, supra note 81, at 1361.
180.
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 295 (1988).
181.
See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also supra
note 134 and accompanying text.
182.
See Pollack, supra note 142, at 760.
183.
Id. at 766.
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dissemination does not necessarily require early or permanent
absorption of a work into the public domain, so long as there is
relatively affordable access for the public during the term of copyright
protection. Often, the owner of the work will offer different versions of
a work, or in different formats, at different price points over time. 184
For example, publishers sell both hardback and paperback versions of
the same book at different times,185 catching more price-sensitive
purchasers with the more affordable paperback copy, which is released
later than the hardback version.186 Libraries purchase copies that are
lent to patrons at no cost, and publishers take the phenomenon into
account when pricing volumes.187 Note that this price discrimination
across versions can facilitate the production of public goods.188 Indeed,
if the commitment to free access trumps the ability of copyright owners
to charge a desired price for their expression, some potential authors
will be dissuaded from spending the time to create new expression.189
Accessibility does not require a copyrighted work to be free.190
The Progress Clause provides for two types of public access: paid
access—guaranteed by the exclusive right secured to the author—and
access through the public domain once a work crosses the threshold of
limited times.191 While copyright protection subsists, the copyright
owner can withhold access to the work unless the public pays for it. 192
184.
See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 635.
185.
See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th
Cir. 2002) (Posner, J).
186.
See Julie Bosman, Paperback Publishers Quicken Their Pace, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2011 (reporting that publishers had shortened the delay in releasing paperback editions from one
year to six months in response to pressure created by the availability of e-book editions).
187.
See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 639.
188.
See, e.g., John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination
in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1810–11 (2009) (describing how public goods
tend to be underprovided in the absence of price discrimination because the rational user will
underreport the utility she derives from a public good, and thus the provider of a public good may
underestimate its value (citing Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 332, 334–36 (1958))); see also In re Brand Name, 288 F.3d at 1031 (“The publishing
industry is extremely competitive but, as just noted, price discrimination is the norm in it.”).
189.
See, e.g., Cake: Flying High After a Record Low, NPR MUSIC (Mar. 3, 2011, 4:59 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134233768/cake-tk (quoting John McCrea, lead singer and
songwriter for Cake, who stated “I see music as a really great hobby for most people in five or [ten]
years,” with “everybody I know, some of them really important artists, studying how to do other
jobs”).
190.
See e.g., Conley & Yoo, supra note 188, at 1805 (arguing that the standard economic
analysis that pits incentives for efficient creation against efficient access might be misguided);
Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 ORE. L. REV. 19, 32–33 (1996)
(“Public access is surely not necessary to the progress of science. . . . If we measure the progress of
science by the profits of scientists, secrecy may greatly enhance the achievements we find.”).
191.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
192.
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012) (requiring would-be users to pay for
access to a work did not deprive them of access to that work).
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Engaging in certain uses of the work without the copyright owner’s
authorization will infringe the owner’s exclusive right.193 In that case,
the owner can seek monetary and injunctive relief,194 while the state
may bring criminal charges.195 It is the author’s ability to determine
the price of the work that provides the reward. The more a given
member of the public values a given work, the higher the price she will
be willing to pay to consume it.196 Once the work falls out of copyright
protection (or if some information never qualifies for protection in the
first instance), anyone can utilize the work in any way, free of cost.197
The limited term of protection provides for a second type of
public access. Once the work is in the public domain, the public can use
the work for free. Distributors, no longer required to meet the copyright
owner’s price, can reproduce and distribute the work for the marginal
cost of production.198
We can interlace the three progress values identified above to
suggest two types of institutional actors that might merit Progress
Clause solicitude. Because promoting progress means providing access
to copyrighted expression, there exist two broad categories of access
intermediaries, and it may be justifiable for Congress to treat
institutions with those characteristics favorably.
The first type of institutional actor is a collection intermediary,
like a library or a university that serves as a repository for expression.
These institutions can fulfill the access-promoting function in different
ways. Some, like public libraries, might use funds from the state to
acquire a cache of materials that the public can used at little or no
cost.199 Others, like private universities, might also cache materials,
with access reserved for tuition paying students or fee-paying

193.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
194.
Id. §§ 501–505.
195.
Id. § 506.
196.
See, e.g., Conley & Yoo, supra note 188, at 1809–10 (“Although every consumer
necessarily consumes [the same quantity of a copyrighted work], different consumers may derive
different levels of utility from doing so . . . and can only signal the intensity of their preferences by
paying different prices.”).
197.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (“[W]hen an article
is unprotected by a patent or a copyright[, for state law to] forbid copying would interfere with the
federal policy, found in Art. I, [§] 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal
statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in
the public domain.”).
198.
See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1318 (2003).
199.
Cf. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 918
(2002). State funded libraries by their nature are funded with taxes. Cf. Federal Funding,
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/libfunding/fed (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
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members.200 In either case, the institution would serve as an
intermediary—purchasing works and making them available to the
public (or at least the portion of the public that subsidizes the private
library).201 These actors would simultaneously provide incentive,
knowledge, and access benefits to the public.
The second category of access intermediaries is distribution
intermediaries, who lower the cost of distributing or publishing
copyrighted works.202 Historically, copyrighted works did not reach the
public without the movie industry, publishers, and record labels to
move physical copies.203 Indeed, it is possible that the copyright system
as it exists today is optimized to incentivize the efforts of distributors,
not creators.204 One might therefore reasonably question whether it
makes sense to craft copyright legislation at the request of, or with the
goal of protecting, such institutions.205 While some scholars have
criticized the central role of middlemen and aggregators in the content
industries, others have noted that, despite these flaws, some works still
require significant precreation funding and centralized postcreation
distribution, which these intermediaries provide.206
Internet providers can also serve as distribution
intermediaries.207 Recall that collection intermediaries generally pay
for a copy of a work and share it with customers.208 In contrast, a
200.
Cf. Werner Cohn, Private Stacks, Public Funding, 24 No. 2 AM. LIBRARIES 182–84
(Feb. 1993), available at http://wernercohn.com/Libraries.html. The materials selected by these
institutions might look somewhat different than those selected by public libraries. Id.
201.
See Trivits v. Wilmington Inst., 417 F. Supp. 160, 163–64 (D. Del. 1976) (noting the
different tax status of free and private subscription libraries under Delaware law).
202.
See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 311 (2002) (noting that among other
virtues, “the Internet and digital technology . . . reduce the transaction costs associated with
connecting artists to the public”).
203.
Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 11 (2006) (conceding that at least until the Internet enabled
distribution without a significant capital investment, “profit-making intermediaries, who
understandably need[ed] a business model calculated to produce profits . . . [were] absolutely
necessary parties in the distribution chain”).
204.
See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON.
389 (2013) (arguing that even if copyright does not induce authors and artists to create, it may be
justified because it induces profit-motivated intermediaries to create).
205.
See, e.g., John Quiggin & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 203, 245 (2008) (“[H]ighly capitalized intermediaries are no longer necessary for the
creation, production, dissemination, and use of culturally significant content, and copyright is no
longer the only mechanism for ensuring that content moves from the author into society.”).
206.
See Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. L.
REV. 623, 672–73 (2012) (creating some types of copyrighted expression like movies and television
programs still requires a significant capital investment and necessitates copyright protection or
some other mechanism to cover the costs of production and distribution).
207.
Cf. Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 587.
208.
Cf. Baker, supra note 199, at 918.
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distribution intermediary provides means to move a copy of a work from
purchaser A to user B.209 Section 512 of the Copyright Act is designed
to insulate Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from secondary liability
for copyright infringement, so long as they merely serve as conduits
between individuals and do not infringe copyright in the work in their
own right.210
Some institutions might serve as collection and distribution
intermediaries, and might thus merit special solicitude. Peter Menell
argues, for example, that Congress should have stepped in early in the
Google Book Search litigation to provide a safe harbor for companies
working with libraries to scan their archives because of the importance
of “making the vast knowledge of the Internet,” as well as the contents
of library archives, accessible “to the public at large.”211 There is a
difference, however, between intermediaries who pay for the material
they redistribute and those who do not. For example, under the current
statutory regime, whether one has purchased or merely leased a copy
will determine the subsequent right to use the copy.212 Likewise, a
library which purchases the copies it distributes to the public might
have a better claim to solicitude under the Copyright Act than a
business built on redistributing copies it duplicates without
compensating the copyright owner—unless maximizing free access is
the priority.
In conclusion, these rough guidelines suggest that we can
identify progress institutions that typically promote the values
embodied in the First Amendment or the Progress Clause. This
institutional framework can provide some assistance in determining
whether a given incident of institutional tailoring by Congress is in
harmony or conflict with Progress principles. For example, libraries are
institutions that provide access and catalog knowledge, in part by
making purchases of copyrighted works.
Identifying progress
institutions is work that courts are particularly well suited to handle,
because it is the type of inquiry that builds on expertise developed in
209.
Cf. Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 587. Historically, distribution
channels moved unique copies of works from one location to another. See id. Digital distribution
through the Internet alters that dynamic by enabling the instantaneous distribution of multiple,
effectively perfect copies from a single original. See id.
210.
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp.
2d 627, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that while the allegedly infringing cloud storage service
qualified for the § 512 safe harbor in many respects, the owner of the company was liable for direct
infringement).
211.
Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital Age,
44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1018, 1046 (2007).
212.
See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use
Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2067 (2012); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion,
58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 910–11 (2011).
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making factual assessments in speech cases.213 In addition, to the
extent that copyright legislation is subject to agency capture,214 a
financially independent judiciary may also best ensure that the
requirements of the Progress Clause are met in regulation involving
copyrighted expression.215 And it is a responsibility the Supreme Court
will soon need to undertake in the free exercise context in light of
Hosanna-Tabor.216
III. IDENTIFYING PROGRESS CLAUSE INSTITUTIONS
The institutional review framework offers an opportunity to
focus on where Congress engages in overt and potentially problematic
tailoring.
Law-making parties—defined broadly to include the
executive branch, the public, and the interests that typically lobby
Congress for copyright protection, in addition to courts and Congress—
should pay attention to the disparate treatment codified in the
Copyright Act. Disparate treatment is important precisely to the extent
that it signals something is amiss in the legislative process that will
lead to constitutionally unjustifiable results. That treatment may
indicate public-choice effects, but not all public choice effects are
pernicious.217 Under the interest-group account of public-choice theory,
statutory outcomes reflect the bargains struck by the groups that lobby
Congress.218 Sometimes, Congress can reach the right results through
imperfect processes, particularly if there is an equilibrium created by
interest groups lobbying for mutually exclusive desired outcomes.219

213.
See, e.g., Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment
Cases after Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2319 (1998) (describing the “norm of
accuracy” which imposes a duty on appellate courts to conduct an independent review of fact
records developed by lower courts or administrative agencies).
214.
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971)).
215.
Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1151
(1991) (arguing that to the extent the focus of the First Amendment has “shifted to protection of
unpopular, minority speech,” an insulated judiciary arguably best protects it).
216.
See generally Robinson, supra note 15, at 181.
217.
See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 777, 804 (2012).
218.
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971)).
219.
See Galle, supra note 217, at 804. In addition, it has been noted that some lobbying
for targeted funds by groups that provide mixed goods, like education, can provide public benefits
like an increase in education overall. See id.
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Therefore, any solution must focus more on problematic results than
potentially flawed processes.220
When institutional tailoring is apparent on the face of the
statute, the proper question is whether the disparity is justified on
progress grounds. When reviewing statutory language granting rights
or exceptions to rights to certain institutions, a court should ask: “if we
uphold this statute as constitutional, will the protection granted to the
particular institution support one or more of the values embodied in the
Progress Clause?” If not, i.e., if the group does not externalize progress
values in its typical operation, it is likely that Congress has overstepped
its authority under the Progress Clause in light of the chilling effect
that copyright protection can have on speakers who wish to make use
of copyrighted expression.221 Thus, the court should hold the statute
unconstitutional unless Congress has something akin to “a compelling
government interest” in treating the institution in question differently
from others and the tailoring is sufficiently narrow to meet that
purpose.222 On the other hand, where the institution externalizes
progress values, a court can safely assume that Congress has made its
decision with an eye toward those values—or at least got lucky—and
rarely, if ever, should it upset the statutory regime.
The institutional review framework also provides a structure for
analyzing flaws in a proposed law before enactment. Courts engage
only in ex post review; however, Congress and the President can
consider whether apparent disparities might signal Progress Clause
220.
See id. This is a key difference between this Article’s proposed intervention and the
one proposed by Neil Netanel. Professor Netanel is concerned with “highly organized, amply
funded, and politically influential speech industries,” Netanel, supra note 4, at 65, and so his
proposal focuses on looking for evidence of interest-group capture of the drafting process, and
applying strict scrutiny to the resulting legislation. See id. at 77. Focusing on disparate bargaining
power cannot resolve every conflict. The Copyright Act of 1976 was primarily a negotiation
between interest groups, subsequently presented to Congress for its approval. It seems difficult to
say, for example, that the cable industries had less clout than broadcasters, or publishers than the
movie industry. See, e.g., Litman, Compromise, supra note 87, at 880–81. What matters most is
the fruit born by the negotiation, not the negotiation itself.
221.
See, e.g., Yen, supra note 57, at 423–33.
222.
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012). This is the “strict
scrutiny” standard that the Supreme Court uses to describe the review it undertakes when
considering whether a content-based or viewpoint-based speech restriction violates the First
Amendment. See id. (“When content-based speech regulation is in question . . . exacting scrutiny
is required.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 71
(1987) (“Laws having severe effects ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny; laws having significant
effects ordinarily trigger intermediate scrutiny; and laws having relatively modest effects
ordinarily trigger deferential scrutiny.”). There is no reason to be particularly wedded to the
traditional categories. For the public and members of Congress, it will likely be easier to focus on
whether disparity is present, and whether the institution receiving preferential treatment is a
valuable link in our national speech or progress infrastructures. Given, however, that this Article
also aims to signal to courts when it is most useful to engage in a serious constitutional inquiry, it
can be helpful to couch the discussion in language with which the Court is familiar.
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problems. Even if neither the legislative nor the executive branch take
the strictures of the Progress Clause seriously, it is possible that the
institutional
review
framework
will
trigger
bottom-up or crowd-sourced engagement with problematic legislative
enactments.223
The Copyright Act contains pervasive institutional tailoring.224
It would take volumes to analyze the entire act through the
institutional review framework. Instead, it is illustrative to consider a
handful of representative cases, suggesting potential revisions and
potential responses to recently proposed legislation.
A. “Easy” Cases
There are some relatively easy cases where Congress reached
the right result in favor of an institution that promotes speech and
progress values. For example, the institutional review framework
suggests little cause for alarm in regard to the special defenses afforded
to libraries and archives under section 108 of the Copyright Act.225
Section 108 gives libraries and archives fairly narrow exceptions to the
copyright owner’s section 106(1) duplication and section 106(3)
distribution rights.226 The section also specifies when and how many
copies a library can make for archival purposes;227 whether the library
can disseminate digital works to its patrons and how it must handle the
dissemination;228 and how a library is to deal with the problem of
“orphan works.”229
If constitutionally grounded solicitude toward an institution
should ever trump Congress’s grant of exclusive rights to the author, a
library seems like the sort of institution that should get a pass. 230
Libraries have historically served as information nexuses for the public
to discover a broad swath of information at a low cost of entry.
Consider, for example, the New York Public Library, which aspires to
provide “true centers of educational innovation and service, vital
community hubs that provide far more than just free books and

223.
See infra Part IV.
224.
See, e.g., Liu, supra note 80, at 105.
225.
17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012).
226.
Id. § 108(a).
227.
See, e.g., id. § 108(b) (allowing “three copies or phonorecords of an unpublished work”).
228.
See, e.g., id. § 108(b)(2) (reproductions in digital format can be distributed or made
available to the public “outside the premises of the library or archives”).
229.
See, e.g., id. § 108(h). Orphan works are works “protected by copyright but whose
rights holders theoretically cannot be located.” Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No.
11-CV-6351, 2012 WL 4808939, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012).
230.
See Schauer, Principles, supra note 12, at 84; HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 205–09.
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materials” and “to clos[e] the digital divide” for New Yorkers without
personal internet access.231 The institution aspires to not only provide
access to copyrighted works, but also to contribute to the expansion and
refinement of knowledge by collecting and categorizing the “distinct
branches of study” that comprise some classical definitions of science.232
From a progress perspective, libraries are a primary institution
providing affordable public access to copyrighted works.233 In addition,
libraries are among the best customers for some classes of authors and
publishers.234 They can also serve as public-use intermediaries—
disseminating information to the public by paying the copyright owner’s
asking price so individual members of the public need not do so.235
It is possible, however, in our new world of costless digital
reproduction, that there is no real difference between libraries and
other sources of free copyrighted material, like a BitTorrent feed.236
Online distributors of individually posted works copied by customers
have repeatedly been on the losing end of copyright litigation.237 But
the institutional library differs in part because “each geographically
located, paper-text library effectively serves a limited number of
people.”238 Furthermore, libraries have a distinct editorial stance,
reflected in the works they purchase and provide to the public.239 Based
on these distinctions, Congress can reasonably provide special
solicitude for libraries without running afoul of the speaker-neutrality
requirement of the Speech Clause because libraries are institutions
that externalize Progress Clause values.
On the other hand, Congress also makes some indefensible
missteps in its institutional tailoring. Section 110 provides exceptions
to one or more of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to several
231.
About The New York Public Library, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY,
http://www.nypl.org/help/about-nypl (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
232.
See Snow, supra note 170, at 259.
233.
See About The New York Public Library, supra note 231.
234.
Cf. Aaron S. Edlin & D.L. Rubenfield, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The “Big Deal”
Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 125–26 (2004) (reporting that academic
journal prices have increased faster than inflation and that libraries have responded in part to the
pressure by cutting down on acquisitions of books and monographs).
235.
The ability of libraries to loan books to the public is protected in part by the first sale
right, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, which allows purchasers of authorized copies to lend them to
others.
236.
See Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Copyright and the Role of Institutions in A
Peer-to-Peer World, 53 UCLA L. REV. 977, 986–87 (2006) (explaining that the differences “good”
libraries and “bad” file-sharers are fewer than one might first imagine).
237.
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005).
238.
Baker, supra note 199, at 918.
239.
See id.; see also Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 639–42 (describing the
differences between print and digital distribution of copyrighted works and their relative effects
on copyright owners in network theory terms).
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groups that do not externalize progress values.240 For example, section
110(6) insulates governmental bodies or nonprofit agricultural or
horticultural organizations from liability for infringing performances by
concessionaires during “an annual agricultural or horticultural fair
exhibition.”241 Similarly, section 110(10) insulates nonprofit veterans’
or fraternal organizations from liability for unlicensed performances, so
long as the performance is to members, and not the general public, and
so long as profits after reasonable expenses are used “exclusively for
charitable purposes.”242 Congress granted this additional protection to
veterans’ and fraternal organizations notwithstanding section 110(4),
which insulates charitable performances where the performers are not
paid.243 As is frequently the case, this particular provision came about
as a direct result of lobbying.244
Special protections for veterans’ and fraternal organizations are
indefensible from a progress perspective. While the Court has correctly
recognized that fraternal organizations can engage in activity that has
First Amendment value for its members, this is no different than any
other organizations. 245 These organizations do not serve an accesspromoting or knowledge-aggregating function, and insulating them
from the requirement to pay the price other citizens pay to use
copyrighted
expression
is
not
justifiable
on
the
exclusive-right axis. Thus, denying copyright owners the ability to
secure licenses for these public performances seems to reflect nothing
more than a successful lobbying effort benefitting veterans and
fraternal organizations.246 Similarly, Congress should scrap the specific
exceptions extended to government organizations and county fairs, as
there is no progress justification for the preferential treatment those
institutions either.
They serve neither access nor knowledge
aggregation functions. Thus, under the institutional review framework
this is an easy call. At first glance, it might seem that the game is not
worth the candle.
It is perhaps unsurprising that veterans’
240.
See 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (2012).
241.
Id.
242.
Id. § 110(10). This protection excludes college fraternities and sororities. Id.
243.
See id. § 110(4). Jon Garon argues instead that in the context of defenses, Congress
has the power to “play favorites,” and as there is no economic justification for that favoritism,
concludes that the subsection 4 exception for charitable organizations and the subsection 5
exception for radio stations, id. at § 110(5), “can only be justified from the progress perspective.”
Garon, supra note 198, at 1326.
244.
See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 ORE. L.
REV. 275, 313 n.210 (1989). See also generally Litman, Compromise, supra note 87, at 880.
245.
See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
246.
See Alvin Deutsch, Politics and Poker—Music Faces the Odds, 34 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 38, 48–49 (1986) (arguing that the § 110(10) exception is evidence of “an erosion of the
rights of copyright proprietors”).
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organizations have the ear of Congress, but the lack of potential
progress values to support the carve-out is indicative of a problem that
requires focused public attention. This is especially true if we desire
copyright protection to operate on something like an equal playing field
or desire the inequities to be constitutionally justifiable.
B. 104A Restoration of Foreign Works
Not every statute will be uniformly consistent or inconsistent
with the demands of proper institutional tailoring. For example,
applying the institutional tailoring framework shows that when
Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) in 1994,
it engaged in both constitutional and unconstitutional tailoring. The
URAA, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A, restored copyright protection to
works for which protection had expired because the authors failed to
observe then-necessary formalities.247 Only works by foreign authors
were eligible.248 The statute granted no restoration to works by US
authors.249
Congress passed the URAA ostensibly to meet international
intellectual property treaty obligations.250
As Justice Ginsburg
recounted in Golan v. Holder, Congress was attempting to secure extra
copyright protection for American authors in foreign jurisdictions by
extending this protection to foreign authors here.251 However, Congress
did not use the least speech-restrictive means to accomplish this goal.252

247.
17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012). Failure to observe formalities like including a copyright
notice on the work no longer deprives a work of copyright protection. Id. § 408(a). Prior to 1989,
failing to observe proper formalities could result in a work falling out of copyright protection, which
happened to many foreign works restored under § 104A. See also Linford, First Publication, supra
note 118, at 606–07. The URAA also “restored” copyright protection to foreign works that never
qualified for protection in the first place either because the author’s home country did not have
“copyright relations” with the United States, or because the work was a sound recording fixed
before 1972. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 881–82 (2012); see also Jake Linford, Trademark
Owner as Adverse Possessor, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 703, 738–39 (2013) [hereinafter Linford,
Adverse Possessor].
248.
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6) & (8) (2002).
249.
Id.
250.
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879–81. But see id. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Congress could have met its treaty obligations in a way that did not cause “so much damage
to public domain material”); Elizabeth Townsend Gard, In the Trenches with § 104A: An
Evaluation of the Parties’ Arguments in Golan v. Holder as it Heads to the Supreme Court, 64
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 199, 203–09 (Oct. 3, 2011).
251.
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (“Members of the Berne Union agree to treat authors
from other member countries as well as they treat their own.” (citing Berne Convention, Sept. 9,
1886, as revised in Stockholm on July 14, 1967, Art. 1, 5(1), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 225, 231–33)).
252.
See id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The dispute in Golan centered on whether the First Amendment or the
Progress Clause required such effort.253
Lawrence Golan and similarly situated plaintiffs had made
expressive use of some foreign works that had fallen out of protection
and would regain protection under the URAA.254 Golan sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the URAA violated
both the Progress and Speech Clauses.255 After two rounds of litigation
in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado and the
Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected Golan’s claims.256
The Supreme Court concluded that the restoration of copyright
protection to foreign works was not an unconstitutional violation of the
Progress Clause requirement that an exclusive right be for a limited
time.257 The First Amendment argument, however, was a closer call.
During the second round of litigation, the plaintiffs convinced the
District Court that Golan and his co-plaintiffs had exercised their First
Amendment rights by creating new expression from then-unprotected
works.258 The Supreme Court rejected that First Amendment argument
as well, concluding that the expressive use by Golan and his coplaintiffs did not justify “exceptional First Amendment solicitude” of
their use or create an inviolable public domain.259
Scholars have criticized the Court’s holding in Golan broadly on
both speech or progress grounds.260 Applying the institutional review
framework allows us to focus solely on the statutory disparity in the
URAA that restores copyright protection to works by foreign authors
but not American authors. From a progress perspective, foreign
authors are not more deserving of profit from their work or more

253.
See id. at 878.
254.
See id. at 878; see also id. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
255.
See Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1216 (D. Colo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Golan
v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
256.
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 883–84 (2012).
257.
See id. at 889.
258.
See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076
(10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012).
259.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891–92 (2012).
260.
See e.g., Fromer, supra note 135, at 1403–05 (concluding that the URAA might have
exceeded the authority granted under the Progress clause); Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note
247, at 738–39 (noting that Golan inverted the standard notion that the public domain is the
baseline over which copyright protection is imposed); Jessica W. Rice, Case Note, “The Devil Take
the Hindmost”: Copyright’s Freedom from Constitutional Constraints After Golan v. Holder, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 283, 298–300 (2013) (stating Golan “has issued so broad a license to Congress
that ostensibly there remain no principled constitutional safeguards against the public domain's
continued erosion.”). But see Netanel, Constraints After Golan, supra note 64, at 1103 (arguing
that although the opinion in Golan narrowly defines the traditional contours of copyright
protection, it nevertheless “fortifies and gives First Amendment import to the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use defense”).
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dependent than US residents on the incentive effects attributable to
copyright protection.261 The failure to restore protection to works
created by US authors might be justifiable, however, if we could identify
a public-access or knowledge-expansion ground to leave US authors less
protected.262 If we assume that the general American public has a
limited understanding of foreign languages, it is possible that progress
for US citizens is optimized by providing the broadest access to the most
valuable knowledge in English.263 That would justify distinguishing
between works based on the language in which they were written, but
not on the residency of the author.264 Many foreign residents also write
or sing in English.265 Other forms of copyrightable expression are not
language dependent at all.266 Thus, the disparity between foreign and
domestic authors under the URAA lacks a progress clause
justification.267
That is not to say that the Supreme Court would necessarily
recognize the constitutional implication of denying copyright protection
to some classes of speakers. Under the Copyright Act of 1790—the first
federal copyright provision—no protection was provided foreign
authors.268 The Court assumes the constitutionality of laws enacted by
the earliest Congresses because those legislative bodies were comprised
of the Framers who drafted the Constitution.269 The URAA is, in some
ways, the mirror image of the Copyright Act of 1790, protecting foreign
works in disparate ways from domestic works in an effort to secure
protection for domestic works on foreign shores.270 Consistent with its
261.
See, e.g., Rice, supra note 260, at 298–300.
262.
See id.
263.
See Josh Hill, Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law Review Survey of
Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 669, 700–01, 703 (2009).
264.
See id.
265.
See Juan F. Perea, Killing Me Softly, with His Song: Anglocentrism and Celebrating
Nouveaux Latinas/os, 55 FLA. L. REV. 441, 442 (2003).
266.
See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
267.
A broad construction of Congress’s treaty powers might be seen to justify the URAA.
See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 332 (2002) (“As a
practical matter, it would be virtually impossible for the United States to play a leadership role if
each individual element in each negotiation had to independently promote the progress of science
in order to make implementing legislation constitutional. And if the only way to promote the
progress of science were to provide incentives to create new works, we would lose all flexibility.”).
But as Heald & Sherry have noted, the Supreme Court has recognized Constitutional limits on
Congress’s treaty powers in the past, and a limitation grounded in the Progress Clause is equally
justified. Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1181–83 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920)); see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1957).
268.
See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124; see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright
Protection for Works of Foreign Origin, 2 IUS GENTIUM, 167, 167–68 (2008).
269.
See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 886 (2012).
270.
See id. at 889.
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general reliance on founding-era statutes to illuminate the scope of
constitutional restrictions, the Court could conclude that extending
different levels of protection to foreign and domestic authors is
standard—or at least one permissible—operating procedure.271 One
could nevertheless be more confident in the constitutionality of the
result reached by Congress if the Court had deigned to ask the question.
Thus, while this Article concludes that the differential protection of
foreign and domestic authors is not justified on progress grounds, it is
more important that courts engage in the institutional review than that
they reach the outcomes proposed by the author. The process itself has
value.
There are, however, Progress Clause justifications for a different
disparity in the URAA. Congress granted certain “ameliorating
accommodations” for “reliance” parties who used foreign works before
the URAA restored protection.272 Reliance parties may continue to
exploit new works derived from a foreign work, pursuant to a
compulsory license, so long as the derivative work was created before
its copyright was restored.273 The more the derivative work differs from
the restored work, the lower the compensation should be under the
compulsory license.274 In addition, the URAA obligates the owner of the
foreign work to notify the public of its intent to enforce a restored
copyright.275
These special privileges for users of restored works are
consistent with the progress values of increasing the knowledge base
and rewarding authors.276 The public gets access to the reliance party’s
new work, and the owner of the restored work gets the compulsory
license as a limited incentive to provide notice to the reliance party.

271.
Cf. id. at 886–87 (concluding that because federal protection has been extended
multiple times to specific patents or copyrights, as well as classes of patent and copyright holders,
the URAA is constitutional); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200–01 (2003) (reaching a similar
conclusion).
272.
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(4) (2012) (defining reliance party); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878, 891;
see also Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 247, at 738, n.164.
273.
17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3) (2012).
274.
Id. § 104A(d)(3)(B) (in the absence of an agreement, compensation is to be set by a
district court judge taking into account “the relative contributions of expression of the author of
the restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work”).
275.
Id. § 104A(e).
276.
The Court in Golan was willing to discount the First Amendment challenge in part
because § 104A made some allowance for reliance parties to continue using the restored works,
subject to a compulsory license. See Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 247, at 738 n.164.
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C. Compulsory Licenses for Radio Broadcasts
Prior to Thomas Edison’s invention of the phonograph, there was
no way to technologically record and reproduce sounds.277 Soon after,
phonographs and radio broadcasts made it possible to broadly
disseminate performances that first occurred somewhere else.278 For
nearly the first hundred years of their existence, sound recordings did
not qualify for federal copyright protection, and the artists who
produced and distributed them relied on the laws of the several states
for protection.279 Congress first extended an exclusive federal right to
reproduce and distribute to sound recordings in 1972,280 which
continued with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.281 Sound
recordings were not covered by the performance right under the 1976
Act because radio broadcasters were accustomed to paying only the
owners of musical works.282 The owner of the sound recording still
receives no royalty from “terrestrial” radio stations.283
Congress later crafted a narrower exclusive right to publicly
perform the sound recording via digital audio transmission.284 The
digital-audio-transmission performance right granted to sound
recordings falls into three tiers, based on the nature of the service that
performs the work. 285 Internet radio stations that stream content
without any listener input, while technically delivering content by
digital audio transmission, are treated like terrestrial radio stations
and are not required to license a performance right from the owner of
the sound recording.286 At the other extreme, the owner of the sound
277.
Apparently, the idea of magnetic tape recording was first posited by Sir Francis Bacon
in 1627, but Edison was the first to make a feasible technology for recording sound that could be
reproduced as such. See Jordan S. Gruber, Foundation for Audio Recordings as Evidence, 23 AM.
JUR. PROOF FACTS 3d 315 § 7, n.33 (originally published in 1993, updated Feb. 2014).
278.
See Alan Korn, Renaming That Tune: Aural Collage, Parody and Fair Use, 22 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 321 (1992).
279.
See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 614–16.
280.
Act of Jan. 21, 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f),
5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e)); 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1972).
281.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(2) (2012), with id. § 106(4).
282.
See Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board’s
March 2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 264 (2008) (“By the time a sound recording copyright was
created in 1972, radio broadcasters had enough political influence to persuade Congress to exclude
sound recordings from claiming a performance right.”).
283.
Carey, supra note 282, at 266–67 (“Effectively this maintains the status quo; a
broadcast of a sound recording on traditional AM or FM radio still does not constitute a
compensable performance under the Copyright Act after the enactment of the DPRA.”).
284.
17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012).
285.
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1629–30 (2001).
286.
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2012).
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recording can secure a property-like injunction against digital
performance by a limited class of operators—those that provide
customers with interactive digital transmissions,287 i.e., systems that
allow users to pick songs online and play them upon request.288 Thus,
to avoid liability for infringing the digital performance right, operators
of interactive services must pay the owner’s asking price.289
In the middle ground, the exclusive right to publicly perform the
sound recording via digital audio transmission is subject to a
compulsory license.290 Operators of subscription services that limit
playback requests may perform the sound recording without
negotiating with the owner of the sound recording, upon payment of a
compulsory license.291 Digital subscription services are available over
cable or satellite, or over the Internet.292 For the former, the compulsory
license rate is calculated pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 801(b).293 The rate for
Internet radio stations is calculated pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(4),
known as the “willing buyer, willing seller standard.”294 Under both
standards, the Copyright Royalty Board—a body comprised of copyright
judges on rotating appointments—makes the rate determination
according to standards set out in the respective statutes.295 The
standards differ, and to date, the § 801(b) rate has been much lower
than the “willing buyer, willing seller” rate.296 When setting a
compulsory license rate for satellite and cable radio stations, § 801(b)
requires Copyright Royalty Judges to take into account the interests of
all relevant parties potentially affected by copyright protection,
including members of the public.297 The “willing buyer, willing seller”

287.
Id. § 114(j)(7).
288.
Id.
289.
Carey, supra note 282, at 287 (“Interactive services do not qualify for statutory
licensing, and hence such services must negotiate privately with record labels for the right use of
sound recordings.”).
290.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Librarian of Congress,
176 F.3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (copyright owner of sound recording is required to grant a license
“to those who seek to transmit sound recordings”).
291.
See Andrew Stockment, Note, Internet Radio: The Case for a Technology Neutral
Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2138 (2009).
292.
See id.
293.
Cable and satellite broadcasters can opt out of the compulsory license by negotiating
directly with owners of sound recordings. See id. at 2166.
294.
See 17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(4) (2012); see also Stockment, supra note 291, at 2138–39.
295.
See id. at 2131.
296.
See id. at 2161–62, 2166.
297.
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012) (compulsory license rates are to maximize the
availability of creative works to the public; secure a fair return to the copyright owner; reflect the
relative contributions, creative and otherwise, by the owner and distributor; and to minimize
disruptive impact on current industry practices).
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standard, which governs Internet radio stations, effectively takes into
account only the needs of the copyright owner.298
Recently, two proposed corrections began wending their way
through Congress. One, the Internet Radio Fairness Act (IRFA),
proposes to reduce the amount that Internet stations pay to the lower
cable and satellite rate under § 801(b).299 Pandora, one of the largest
Internet radio stations, firmly supports the IRFA.300
This is
unsurprising, as passage of the IRFA could save Pandora significant
licensing fees.301 The other, the Interim FIRST Act (FIRST Act),
proposes to bring everyone up to the “willing buyer, willing seller”
standard, ostensibly to insure that artists and record labels receive the
compensation to which they are entitled.302
Assuming that licensing uniformity is desirable, and one act or
the other should pass, the IRFA is better suited to serve progress
goals.303 Satellite and cable stations that charge customers for
subscriptions would need to pass an increased license rate required by
the FIRST Act on to consumers, while subscription-based Internet radio
stations could pass savings on to consumers under the IRFA.
Nonsubscription stations would have pass costs, or could pass savings,
on to advertisers. If it proves difficult to recoup the increased licensing
fees, satellite stations that rely on advertising dollars to provide free
Internet music service would need to charge consumers, or work with
smaller profit margins. Implementing the FIRST Act could thus reduce
the number of satellite and cable radio providers, which in turn would
reduce access to less popular programs, as advertisers are more likely
to gravitate to top-40 programming.304 Thus, access to some Internet
programming would be restricted.

298.
See id. § 114(f)(2)(B); Stockment, supra note 291, at 2165–66.
299.
Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, S. 3609, 112th Cong (2d Sess. 2012).
300.
See Ben Sisario, Proposed Bill Could Change Royalty Rates for Internet Radio, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/business/media/proposed-bill-couldchange-royalty-rates-for-internet-radio.html.
301.
See Andrew Richards, Opinion: Are Pandora’s Music Genome Operational Costs
Worth It?, O MUSIC AWARDS BLOG (Dec. 5, 2012), http://blog.omusicawards.com/2012/12/opinionare-pandoras-music-genome-operational-costs-worth-it.
302.
See Jerry Nadler, Interim Fairness in Radio Starting Today Act of 2012 (Aug. 7, 2012,
3:36
PM),
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/082012_Nadler_streaming_
rates_bill.pdf; see also Jennifer Martinez, Nadler Circulates Draft Legislation on Music Royalties,
THE HILL: HILLICON VALLEY (Aug. 20. 2012, 6:59 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconvalley/technology/244413-nadler-circulates-draft-legislation-on-music-royalties.
303.
But see DiCola, supra note 11 at 1895-99 (arguing that neither IRFA nor the FIRST
Act sufficiently meets a principle grounded in the First Amendment that requires equal treatment
of music distributor).
304.
Cf. Steve Johnson, Top 40 Radio is Back on Top, POPMATTERS (Oct. 9, 2009),
http://www.popmatters.com/article/112858-top-40-radio-is-back-on-top.
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In addition, while the owners of musical compositions and sound
recordings would recoup more licensing fees per use under the FIRST
Act, a high compulsory licensing fee is no more consistent with a
natural-right justification for copyright protection than a low one,
regardless of the value of the compulsory license. Furthermore, the
IRFA uses the §801(b) standard, which requires Copyright Royalty
Judges to take into account not only the needs of copyright owners, but
also radio stations as access intermediaries and the public as
listeners.305 As either compulsory license ignores autonomy interests,
Congress should choose the process that better applies progress values
and also leads to lower costs.306 Here, the institutional review
framework gives us a fairly clear indication of which statutory
enactment the public should support.
IV. PUBLIC INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
When invited to consider First Amendment critiques of the
Copyright Act, the Court has been reluctant to apply traditional First
Amendment scrutiny, although it has continued to recognize that First
Amendment values are inherent in the copyright regime.307 The
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have even stepped back from the active
policing of intellectual property protection demonstrated by the Warren
Court. For example, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,308 the Court held
that the state could not secure to an inventor a patent on an invention
already in the public domain.309 Turning again to the question of the
permeability of the public domain in Golan, the Court characterized as
dicta the oft-cited perspective from Graham that the Progress Clause
limits Congress’s power to craft intellectual property protections.310
The Court in Golan found the Graham holding that an invention was
not eligible for patent protection entirely unrelated to the question of

305.
See supra notes 293–298 and accompanying text.
306.
But see DiCola, supra note 11 at 1897 (criticizing IRFA’s focus on drastically lowering
royalty rates for webcasters because “[e]qual treatment [of music distribution services] has
economic benefits that have nothing to do with reducing the level of royalties, which is a separate
policy choice.”).
307.
See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
308.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
309.
See id. at 6 (holding that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available”); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–30
(1964) (patents may issue, under the Progress Clause, only when “a genuine ‘invention’ or
‘discovery’ [can] be demonstrated,” and limitations on the exercise of the patent must be “strictly
enforced” (internal citations omitted)).
310.
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 887 (2012).

2014]

THE INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS CLAUSE

579

Congress’ power to increase a patent’s duration.311 As the Tenth Circuit
noted in its review of Golan, “Congress has expansive powers when it
legislates under the [Progress] Clause, and this court may not interfere
so long as Congress has rationally exercised its authority.”312
One way to read Golan, and its predecessor Eldred, is that
together they suggest that the current Court is simply uninterested in
claims that congressional activity in the intellectual property sphere
should remain within the boundaries set by the Progress Clause and
the First Amendment.313 The Supreme Court’s deferential stance in
Eldred and Golan leaves the public without an effective ex post check
on congressional activity. Any amendments to the Copyright Act that
cross the President’s desk with a signature may be effectively immune
from institutional review.
While this Article makes the case for carefully scrutinizing
institutional tailoring, it is possible that the Court cannot be moved
from looking at copyright as the kind of regime “that does not need to
be subjected to normal First Amendment [or Progress Clause]
analysis.”314 But pressing the issue, even on the losing side, has some
inherent value. As Professor Schauer notes, “winning is better than
losing publicly, but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being
ignored.”315 Ideally, a renewed focus on disparate treatment will
encourage the Supreme Court to apply more searching constitutional
analysis of the Copyright Act, at least where the disparate protection
signals potential public choice problems.316 And there has been some
positive motion—eight of the Justices in Eldred “acknowledged that the
First Amendment was not totally irrelevant.”317
Furthermore, public losses can motivate public responses. For
example, when the Supreme Court decided, in Kelo v. City of New
London, that using eminent domain to seize the homes of residents to
build a business complex was a “public use” under the Takings Clause,
state and local law-making bodies responded quickly to mollify public
311.
See id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 202, n.7 (2003)).
312.
Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at
213).
313.
Subsequent courts construing Eldred conclude that the case stands “for the
proposition that it is for Congress, not courts, to determine what promotes progress.” Oliar, supra
note 2, at 1834 (citing Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 150–52 (2005)).
314.
Adrian Liu, Copyright as Quasi-Public Forum: Reinterpreting the Conflict Between
Copyright and the First Amendment, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383, 397
(2008).
315.
Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1799.
316.
See id. at 1800.
317.
See id. at 1799. See also Netanel, Constraints After Golan, supra note 64, at 1096–97
(arguing that the Court’s talk of traditional contours provides a stronger standard for First
Amendment than is apparent at first).
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disapproval.318 David Fagundes has noted that the public outcry to the
Court’s decision in Eldred was relatively muted.319 More recently,
however, the public has been motivated to respond to proposed
legislation that looks like a congressional overreach in the intellectual
property realm. In 2011, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was
introduced in the House of Representatives,320 and the Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act (PIPA) was introduced in the Senate.321 The bills included
“highly technical DNS blocking provisions that were strongly opposed
by engineers, Internet founders, and law professors.”322 The opposition
of informed parties was a starting point, but the passage of SOPA and
PIPA seemed fait accompli until the general public—tipped off by a day
of
Internet
blackouts
on
popular
services
like
Wikipedia—responded en mass to protests the bills.323 While the public
response was certainly encouraged by ISPs and intermediaries who
viewed it as a threat to the operation of the Internet,324 it was the public
response, not the centralized opposition, that sent legislators of all
political stripes scurrying to distance themselves from the bill.325
There are two problems facing public advocacy on copyright
policy. The institutional review framework can help ameliorate both.
First, statutory language can be complex, particularly for recent
revisions to the Act.326 This complexity tends to exacerbate the second
problem: it is difficult for a diffuse populace to mobilize as effectively as
a smaller, concentrated group with similar goals. This collective action
problem makes public advocacy difficult, demonstrably so when we

318.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005); David Fagundes,
Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 652–53 (2010).
319.
See id. at 653–54.
320.
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
321.
PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
322.
David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of
International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 137 (2012). “DNS” is
an acronym for the Internet’s Domain Name System. Id. at 112.
323.
See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy
Bills,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
20,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/
technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html?_r=1& (reporting that more than 10 million voters
contacted lawmakers to voice opposition to the bills).
324.
See Maayan Y. Vodovis, Note, Look over Your Figurative Shoulder: How to Save
Individual Dignity and Privacy on the Internet, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 824–25, n.120 (2012).
325.
See Annemarie Bridy, Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A
Discourse-Theoretic Perspective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153,
154 (2012) (“Neither SOPA nor PIPA will become law as they were initially drafted . . . .”);
Stephanie Condon, PIPA, SOPA Put on Hold in Wake of Protests, CBS NEWS (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57362675-503544/pipa-sopa-put-on-hold-in-wake-ofprotests.
326.
See, e.g., Joseph Liu, supra note 80, at 89, 110.
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consider the way copyright law is shaped in favor of copyright owners,
often without considering the needs of copyright users.327
The institutional review framework can facilitate activism,
encouraging both copyright critics and enthusiasts to ask at an early
stage whether new additions to the Copyright Act are consistent with
the congressional mandate. If the Court plans to continue its historical
hands-off approach when reviewing copyright enactments for
constitutional validity, perhaps the public can crowd source some
hands-on responses.328 The institutional review framework will provide
a way to think about when action might be required. With luck,
pressure from both courts and the public will encourage the legislative
and executive branches to consider the impact of copyright legislation
on our constitutional values of preventing the abridgement of speech
and promoting of progress. At all stages, applying the institutional
review framework can flush out the most obvious and problematic cases
of institutional tailoring.
It is hard to imagine frequent negative public responses to
copyright legislation like those that met SOPA and PIPA.
Nevertheless, the institutional review framework can give the public
something relatively obvious to watch for.329 Where a copyright
provision gives extra protection to certain copyright holding institutions
rather than all copyright holders, or provides a defense to one
institutional user rather than the public as a whole, society should
collectively ask whether the disparate treatment is consistent with
constitutional values. If not, this could serve as a signal that a bottomup, crowd-sourced response is appropriate.
Drawing the attention of courts and the public to disparate
treatment does not prevent either group from giving careful scrutiny to
situations where disparate treatment is not apparent on the face of a
statute. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, for
example, is full of cases where a statute that is content-neutral on its
face is held unconstitutional because it provides too much discretion to
the executive.330 The Court is capable of locating problematic discretion
in those cases and would be able to apply the same skill set to determine

327.
See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 535–36 (1998).
328.
See supra notes 64–67, 307–313 and accompanying text.
329.
Unlike the response to Kelo, however, there is no direct appeal that the public can
make to local jurisdictions to resolve problematic copyright enactments, where the federal statute
preempts the field. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). Still, to the extent members of Congress are at all
sensitive to public pressure, some localized displeasure voiced in the right cases is more likely to
cause members of Congress to reconsider their stance than no response at all. See supra notes 323–
327 and accompanying text.
330.
See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133, n.10 (1992).
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if statutes that are ostensibly egalitarian nevertheless threaten critical
constitutional values. The institutional review framework simply
provides a structure to consider problematic disparity in the Copyright
Act.
CONCLUSION
This Article lays bare the tension between the Supreme Court’s
extreme distrust of speaker-based speech restrictions and the Court’s
extremely deferential embrace of Congress’s authority to pass copyright
legislation that differentiates between institutions. Consistency might
suggest stripping all disparate treatment from the Copyright Act, but
some disparity may promote the goals embodied in the Progress Clause.
At a minimum, examining the institutional tailoring in the Copyright
Act by asking which, if any, favored institutions externalize Progress
Clause values should sharpen judicial review, shape congressional
activity, and provide a path for public action with regard to copyright
reform.

